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Empirical evidence suggests that the higher-order effects 
of natural disasters, which affect intangible assets, may 
be even more important than the material inter-industry 
effects.  However, most existing general equilibrium 
models ignore higher order effects concerning human 
capital. Moreover, it is recognized that natural resource 
dependence increases vulnerability to natural disasters. 
Recent studies have indeed shown the potential 
importance of subsistence traps caused by asset losses 
in low-income economies from a partial equilibrium 
perspective.   
   This paper presents an analysis that allows for 
endogenous investments in real assets (physical capital) 
as well as in human capital, explicitly considering the 
potential for subsistence traps arising from minimum 
consumption and minimum natural resource 
irreversibility thresholds. The general equilibrium 
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ramifications of subsistence traps are developed. The 
main issue is that the economy may be subject to 
hysteresis: A temporary shock such as a natural disaster 
may leave permanent consequences for the economy.  An 
obvious permanent effect of a one-time disaster shock 
is that physical man-made and natural assets owned 
especially by poor households may end up completely 
wiped out. The disaster may not be the direct cause; 
it may be that poor households would have to obtain 
minimum subsistence consumption out of depleted 
assets.  However, not all permanent effects of a one-
time shock are negative. Under certain conditions, the 
destruction of man-made physical and natural capital 
may have general equilibrium effects that increase the 
incentives to invest in human capital and may even 
propel a formerly stagnating economy into a virtuous 
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Natural Disasters and the Dynamics of Intangible Assets 
 
A growth theoretic understanding of the long-run impacts of natural disasters is still at an early 
stage. In a recent survey paper, Okuyama (2009a) concluded that the lack of theoretical 
formalization has been a factor preventing the integration of the economics of disasters into general 
development theory and has affected our ability to understand more comprehensibly the 
implications of disasters.  The present paper can be regarded as a contribution in this direction.  The 
theoretical model proposed here incorporates important empirical stylized facts about disasters and 
integrates certain specific observations in the literature – which hitherto have remained as interesting 
but isolated insights – into a comprehensive macro growth framework.  
 
This paper focuses on the dynamics of intangible assets in the aftermath of disasters.  It shows that 
the dynamics of human capital and natural resources play an important role affecting the patterns of 
recovery and potential long-run growth effects of disaster shocks
1.  Recent studies have shown that 
in normal times public policy in a large number of countries, especially middle-income ones, tends to 
prioritize investments in physical assets to the detriment of investments in intangible assets (World 
Bank, 2000; López and Toman, 2006).  These biases may be a source of economic inefficiency 
because, in contrast with tangible assets, intangible assets tend to be affected by serious market 
imperfections which reduce the incentives of the private sector to invest in such assets.  A public 
policy bias in favor of tangible assets is particularly notorious in the allocation of government 
expenditures (López, Thomas and Wang, 2008). Governments tend to allocate a large share of 
government expenditures to private goods in the form of subsidies favoring either investment in 
tangible assets or consumption of the elites and insufficient expenditures to public goods including 
education, health care, R&D, environmental protection and other intangible assets.  López and 
Islam (2008) have shown that these public spending biases are costly; countries that spend the most 
in private goods tend to grow much slower over the long run than countries that are less affected by 
such biases.  
 
                                                            
1 In a literal sense natural resources are tangible but we consider them intangible in the economic sense because they are 
often undervalued due to institutional and market failure.       
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A key consequence of this pro-tangible asset public policy bias is that over the long run a distortion 
in the asset composition of the economy emerges; the tangible/intangible asset stock ratio becomes 
too high.  For reasons to be clarified below, this distortion further reduces the incentives to the 
private sector to invest in human capital and other intangible assets.   But the fact that intangible 
assets grow little also implies that the incentives to invest in physical assets also decline over time. 
Growth then becomes increasingly dependent on continuous increases of government subsidies to 
promote tangible asset investment, which in turn forces the government to devote an ever increasing 
fraction of the expenditures to private goods.  That is, the asset distortion may be self-reinforcing 
meaning that it tends to grow deeper over time ultimately becoming an obstacle for economic 
growth.   
 
We show that a natural disaster that affects more tangible than intangible assets may have an 
important silver lining effect: It may reduce the asset distortion and thus promote faster economic 
growth. The issue is whether or not the same biases that affect public policy in normal times are 
present in the aftermath of major disasters. Some empirical evidence suggests that in some countries 
this has been the case but not in others. Thus, while natural disasters can have dramatic negative 
effects on the level  of per capita income they can also represent an opportunity that nature provides 
to mitigate the effects of past policy distortions; natural disasters may correct a distorted asset 
structure created by misguided public policies.  We show below that if governments do not insist in 
repeating the policy biases of the past, natural disasters that reduce the tangible/intangible asset ratio 
may trigger an increase of the rate of per capita income growth over the long run.  By contrast, 
disasters that affect more intangible than tangible assets may exacerbate the asset distortion and thus 
be a loss-loss phenomenon by causing both a reduced level and reduced long run growth of income.   
       
We show that disasters, even if they affect merely a segment of the economy, can have important 
economy-wide ramifications by affecting the post-disaster dynamics of both human capital and 
natural resources.  An important finding mostly ignored in the literature is that the nature of capital 
markets is an important determinant of the effects of disasters. We alternatively consider two 
economies: (i) one with undeveloped capital markets and where the production of new human 
capital is mainly provided by the state (the “poor” economy); (ii) one with fully developed capital 
markets which allows the for-profit private sector to contribute to the production of new human       
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capital (the “middle-income” economy).  The results of the analysis generally confirm at the 
economy-wide level the findings of recent empirical analyses at the micro level:  The efficiency of 
capital markets (and labor markets) is a key determinant of the extent of the impact of productivity 
shocks on rural households’ income (Jayachandran, 2006; Gitter and Barham, 2008).            
  
Several papers have emphasized the importance of system-wide impacts of disasters through 
material inter-industry relationships; these are the so-called higher order effects (Rose, 2004)
2.  
Previous studies have provided indirect empirical evidence suggesting that higher order effects 
affecting intangible assets such as human capital may be even more important than the material 
inter-industry effects (Skidmore and Toya, 2002).  However, most existing general equilibrium 
models ignore higher order effects concerning human capital
3. Moreover, there is ample recognition 
that natural resource dependence increases the vulnerability of the economy to disasters (Benson 
and Clay, 2004). Recent studies have shown the potential importance of subsistence traps caused by 
losses of natural resources and productive capital in low income economies exclusively from a partial 
equilibrium perspective (Carter et. al., 2007).   
 
Unlike previous studies the present paper evaluates the role of natural resource dependence and 
human capital investment from a general equilibrium dynamic perspective. We develop a dynamic 
general equilibrium model that provides a framework to rigorously analyze the behavior of an 
economy after a disaster shock. In contrast with standard computable general equilibrium models 
(CGEs), the model developed here is analytical and simple enough to be tractable, permitting the 
identification of the mechanisms at work and the derivation of comparative dynamic predictions 
about various effects of disaster shocks.  The analysis allows for endogenous investments in “real” 
assets (i.e., physical capital) as well as investments in human capital explicitly considering the 
potential for subsistence traps arising from both minimum consumption and minimum natural 
resource irreversibility thresholds. The general equilibrium ramifications of subsistence traps are 
                                                            
2 For example if a power company’s production facility is damaged by a natural hazard, the production loss is specific to 
the production company. Other firms that use the electricity may not be directly damaged but may suffer large losses as 
a consequence of power disruptions.  
3 See Okuyama, 2008a for a critical review of the methodologies used for the literature for the estimation of the 
economic impact of disasters; also, Okuyama, 2008b uses input-output and social accounting matrix methodologies to 
analyze 10 disaster cases, none of which includes human capital.       
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emphasized.   The paper summarizes certain key empirical stylized facts of disasters available in the 
literature, shows that the predictions of the model developed here are mostly consistent with these 
empirical stylized facts, and contributes to developing further explanations for some.     
 
I. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND STYLIZED FACTS OF DISASTERS 
 
In this section we present some of the empirical evidence available which is relevant to our analysis. 
The literature reports two types of empirical evidence: (i) Robust evidence on which there is a 
degree of consensus in the literature. (ii) Weak evidence on which there is no agreement in the 
literature; these are often contradictory findings across studies and across disasters. We use the 
robust evidence to provide certain empirical underpinnings that justify some of the assumptions 
used in the conceptual model provided in the next sections. Then the results and predictions of the 
analysis are used to shed light on the conditions under which we expect the various conflicting 
outcomes reported in the literature as part of evidence (ii) above.    
 
The contradictory empirical evidence is in part due to the poor quality of the information available 
especially of the cross country data. These data is in general too blunt to allow us to identify effects 
of disasters which generally affect only a portion of the country. In other cases even micro based 
data provide decidedly inadequate indicators.  This data inadequacy means that empirical studies are 
unlikely to elucidate certain effects of disasters. This gives even more prominence to the need for a 
rigorous theoretical analysis that can capture at least a subset of the key complexities of reality.  Such 
a model could be regarded as complementary with empirical studies, especially of aspects on which 
the quality of the empirical information is rather poor. 
 
1. Long-run impact of disaster shocks on economic growth.  An important stylized fact is that disasters, while 
causing significant one-time reductions on assets and per capita income, do not necessarily reduce 
long-term economic growth. In fact, three of the greatest known disasters, the 1960 earthquake in 
Chile (9.5 Richter scale), the 1998 hurricane Mitch in Honduras, and the 2004 earthquake and 
Tsunami in the province of Aceh in Indonesia, have apparently had very different consequences for 
long-run economic growth.  All three disasters affected a significant segment of the population and 
devastated an important part of the productive capital. While the Chile disaster caused no discernible       
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long-run effect on economic growth or on real wages over the next ten years (Coeymans, 1999; De 
Gregorio, 2005; Cenda, 2007), the post-disaster rate of economic growth in Honduras is somehow 
lower than the rates prior to the disaster, and the province of Aceh appears to have been able to 
increase economic growth over the three years after the Tsunami (Blanco Armas et al. 2008).  Table 
1 shows the vastly heterogeneous performance of per capita GDP growth before and after major 
disasters for selected countries. 
 
Studies on the (ex-ante) impact of the expectation of periodic but not necessarily devastating 
disasters as opposed to the ex-post effect of one massive disaster as the cases mentioned above also 
provide contradictory findings.  Skidmore and Toya (2002), for example, find that a higher 
probability of climatic disasters is associated with a faster rate of economic growth, a phenomenon 
that the authors attribute to “creative destruction” caused by disasters (an acceleration of the 
adoption of technologies embodied in physical capital caused by the need to replace such capital).  
However, Cuaresma et al. (2008) and Rasmussen (2004) found that this hypothesis appears to be 
relevant only to middle-income and developed countries. Still another study finds that the impact of 
disaster proneness on economic growth is mixed with large disparities depending not only on the 
level of development of the country but also on country size and type of disaster
4.   
 
A more recent study examines the effects of disasters on sector growth rather than merely on 
aggregate growth for the whole economy (Loayza et al., 2009).  This is important because 
disaggregate sector output measures are likely to be more sensitive to disasters (which often affect 
more intensively particular sectors) than the usual aggregate GDP measures. Table 2 summarizes 
their findings; in general they find that disasters that reduce the capital/labor ratio are likely to be 
followed by faster sector growth while events that increase the capital/labor ratio are more likely to 
be followed by slower sector growth. The empirical association between the consequences of 
disasters for economic growth and for the asset ratio of the economy that these authors unearthed is 
particularly important; as can be seen below the model that we develop here predicts and explains 
precisely this outcome.  
 
                                                            
4  Meanwhile Bluedorn (2005) argues that the development of a country is inhibited by the constant exposure to 
hurricanes since these represent large negative capital shocks which can consistently impoverish a country.       
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2. Long-run impacts on human capital.  The same degree of ambiguity plagues the analysis of the impact 
of disasters or disaster proneness on human capital. Certain empirical analyses have found that 
human capital increases as a consequence of disasters (Skidmore and Toya, 2002).  However, other 
authors have reached opposite conclusions (Benson and Clay, 2004).  Skoufias (2003) and Poop 
(2006) argue that human capital accumulation may decrease or increase after disasters depending on 
the role of the wage as a measure of the opportunity cost of potential students or as a measure of 
income affecting the ability of financially constrained households to afford human capital 
investments. 
 
A possible reason for this disparity of empirical results is that the quality of the empirical proxies 
used for human capital is questionable at best. School attendance or years of education are woefully 
inadequate indicators of cognitive levels as recognized in the recent literature (Wößmann, 2003; De 
la Fuente and Doménech, 2006; Hanushek and Wößmann, 2008).    
 
Another important issue concerns the magnitude of the losses of human capital. With the exception 
of mega disasters, direct losses of human life are not dramatic. However, in countries with a long 
tradition of international emigration (e.g., Central Americans in the USA), major disasters may cause 
a significant emigration response (UNDP, 2006, Benson and Clay, 2004). This is likely to have 
significant effects on human capital assets in the country especially given that migrants are often 
those with above average skill levels (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006, Mishra, 2006).  Table 3 
compares the post-disaster losses of human capital and physical capital for two cases for which these 
data are available, Japan (Kobe 1995) and Honduras (Mitch 1998).  In Kobe the loss of population 
(due to deaths and out-migration) was minimal compared to the losses of physical capital. While in 
Honduras the human losses were much larger than in Kobe, still the losses of capital were much 
greater. That is, even in a country where the population has shown high proclivity to migrate mainly 
to the USA the losses of physical capital tend to be much greater than the labor losses
5.            
 
3. Nature and distribution of damages.  Not all geographic areas of the countries are equally affected by 
disasters. The greatest effects tend to concentrate in particular areas which are more vulnerable to 
                                                            
5 Of course we are not claiming that this is always the case.  As it is implicit in Loayza et.al. (2009), there are apparently 
cases where the human loses have been closer to those affecting physical capital.         
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disasters and where often most of the poor live (World Bank, 2003, Benson and Clay 2004).   
Disasters only rarely affect a whole country; Honduras Mitch is probably the one disaster that came 
closest to affecting the whole country’s territory and population. But even in Honduras the effects 
were much more intense in certain rural areas than in the major cities. As can be seen in the sample 
of events presented in Table 4, with the exception of Honduras, even massive disasters have tended 
to affect less than 25% of the country’s population.  The greatest and most massive earthquake ever 
measured- Chile 1960- which caused damages and death in as far away as Japan and the Pacific 
Islands, affected mainly one-third of the country, while the rest was basically unscathed. 
 
A related issue is that most disasters in rich and middle-income countries destroy much more 
physical capital than human capital.  Human lives are usually spared in these countries because 
prevention mechanisms are in place to protect lives and physical capital tends to be highly 
concentrated to exploit economies of agglomeration which means that the potential for physical 
capital destruction is higher than in the case where it is more dispersed. By contrast, in poor 
countries the disasters affect human lives more with somehow lower damage to physical capital 
which is scarcer in the first place and is much more geographically dispersed than in developed 
countries (ADPC, 2005). Natural capital is affected in similar ways in both poor and rich countries 
but poor economies tend to be much more dependent on natural capital as a productive asset than 
rich countries. 
 
Often the most serious impacts of disasters fall upon the poor, mainly the rural poor (World Bank, 
2003, Benson and Clay 2004).  Table 4 illustrates this tendency for selected cases where the 
information for the sector impact of disasters has been quantified.  As can be seen in the table, most 
disasters have affected much more intensely the agriculture, fisheries and forestry sectors than the 
more modern enterprise sector.   The rural poor tend to live in vulnerable areas and they are 
economically most dependent on natural resources for their survival.   Several authors have pointed 
out that the vulnerability of the poor relates not only to their geographic location but also to the 
likelihood that the incomes losses caused by the disaster may propelled them into poverty traps 
ultimately rendering them destitute, unable to sustain themselves over the long run.  Carter et al., 
2007, provide micro empirical evidence for this phenomenon for Honduras and Ethiopia (see also 
IMF, 2003; Hallegate and Dumas, 2009).        
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4. Government responses.  In general government responses in part depend on the extent of foreign aid 
that they receive. However, studies have shown that in most cases government reallocate 
expenditures in a major way for the next few years after the disaster (Table 5).  Government 
expenditures are often redirected from recurrent to capital expenditures (Benson and Clay, 2004).  
This reallocation may cause significant disruptions in the provision of vital government services, 
especially in the provision of human capital services and other intangible assets (Molina et al., 2009).  
In general, governments emphasize infrastructure rebuilding as a top priority while human capital 
and natural capital rebuilding receive less attention.  Graphic 1 illustrates this for the case of Aceh.     
 
II. POLICY BIASES IN NORMAL TIMES 
 
In this section we look at certain public policies during normal times that in the end may 
significantly condition the economy’s response to disaster shocks.  In normal times public policy in a 
large number of countries, specially middle income ones, tend to prioritize growth in physical assets 
to the detriment of intangible assets (World Bank, 2000; López and Toman, 2006).  These policies 
may exacerbate rather than reduce the losses associated with the most ubiquitous market failures 
such as those related to imperfect property rights and capital market imperfections. As shown by 
López and Islam (2008) these market imperfections tend to have a much greater impact on 
investments on intangible assets than on physical capital. As a consequence of these market failures 
countries tend to under invest in intangible assets and over investment in physical capital relative to 
intangible assets.  Public policies biased in favor of physical capital thus exacerbate these asset 
distortions often magnifying the efficiency losses associated with market imperfections.  
 
The public policy bias in favor of tangible assets is particularly notorious in the allocation of 
government expenditures (López, Thomas and Wang, 2008).  Governments tend to spend too much 
in private goods in the form of subsidies favoring either investment in physical capital or 
consumption of the elites and too little in public goods including education, health care, R&D, 
environmental protection and other intangible assets. Graphic 2 shows the shares of government 
spending in public goods broadly defined to include spending in human capital, environmental 
protection, knowledge creation, social subsidies, as well as other conventional public goods over the 
period 1985-2005 for a sample of middle income countries. As can be seen in the graphic, while       
 
10
some countries such as Costa Rica, Uruguay and Chile devote a large fraction of government 
spending to public goods, most of the countries considered spend a much smaller fraction in public 
goods, many of them less than 50%. That is, they spend a large fraction of the government budgets 
in non-social subsidies which as shown by López, Thomas and Wang (2008) are mainly geared to 
subsidize large corporations and the income of the elites.  Table 6 provides more details about the 
evolution of government spending for four countries, China, India, Brazil and Chile.  The table 
shows the share of expenditures in items that can be clearly identified as subsidies to the elites (the 
“Type B” expenditures); all four countries spend a large fraction of the budget in such subsidies. 
Table 7 shows that in several countries just fuel subsidies absorbed an inordinate part of the 
government total expenditures.  Government spending in private goods thus tends to crowd out 
spending in public goods. 
 
The impact of these policy biases is reflected in the dynamics of the various assets over time. In 
general the development of asset growth accounting data is still in its early stage. However, with the 
limited information available one can at least get an idea of the asset growth for certain countries, 
especially middle-income and high income countries which tend to have a better informational base. 
Table 8 compares the growth rates of tangible versus intangible assets for a sample of countries in 
Latin America over the 1990-2001 period.  The table shows that while in all but two countries 
tangible assets (physical capital) exhibit positive per capita growths, in all but two countries 
intangible assets have experienced declines.  Obviously there is no reason to believe that asset 
growth should be balanced (although a key tenet of endogenous growth theory is to postulate 
balanced asset growth as an optimal equilibrium condition) but such a big disparity in asset growth 
over a relatively long period of time and for all countries is likely to reflect economic inefficiency.  
 
Table 9 shows a more aggregate picture of the disparities between growth in physical versus human 
capital for a large sample of middle-income and high-income countries based on recent data of 
wealth indicators developed at the World Bank.  The physical versus human capital gap is 
particularly large among lower middle income countries where the growth rate of physical capital 
almost doubles the rate of growth of human capital.  These indicators tend to overestimate the true 
growth of human capital because they do not account for the qualitative aspects of education. In 
general countries are able to increase school enrollment quite often but the goal of education quality       
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improvements is much more elusive.  Table 10 provides a glimpse at this issue. It presents data on 
international test scores for the six developing countries that have participated in such tests and six 
upper-middle-income countries.  Of the 11 countries which have participated in the tests in 2000 
and the year 2005 only four exhibit a significant test score improvement between the two years while 
the rest have either experienced pronounced declines or have remained basically stagnant.  While 
this is a small sample, it does illustrate how seemingly successful countries when judged by the 
standard measures of economic growth such as Spain, Mexico, Ireland, Brazil and Greece do not 
seem to be making any progress in increasing the quality of education. This may reflect under 
investment in human capital, an important intangible asset.  
 
The evidence provided above, while certainly not conclusive, seems to be consistent with the idea 
that a large number of countries appear to excessively focus in the accumulation of tangible assets to 
the detriment of intangible assets, particularly human capital and natural capital.  Past distortions 
affecting the allocation of government spending as well as other public policies that tend to bias the 
incentives in favor of tangible assets materialize over time in a progressively more unbalanced asset 
composition of the economy. Many economies may reach a tangible to intangible asset ratio that is 
so distorted that becomes an obstacle to economic growth.  López and Islam (2008) have in fact 
provided a vast volume of econometric evidence showing that these public spending biases are 
indeed costly.  The higher the share of spending in public goods the higher is economic growth over 
the long run.  This confirms the notion that, on average, countries overspend in private goods and 
under-spend in public goods.  One can conclude that if the reason why growth decelerates in 
countries that overspend in promoting tangible assets to the detriment of intangible ones is the asset 
ratio distortion that such policies incubate, natural disasters that affect mostly the tangible assets may 
in fact contribute to reduce such distortion and hence allow for faster economic growth over the 
long run.     
                                                   
 III. THE MODEL  
 
In Section I we have shown that the empirical evidence on the effects of disasters is in certain 
respects conflictive (i.e., facts 1 and 2 in Section I) while it is far more consistent in other aspects 
(i.e., facts 3 and 4). The structure of the model presented below reflects the later group of stylized       
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facts. At the same time the model is designed to be flexible enough to allow for alternative effects of 
disasters concerning the first group of stylized facts, trying to identify conditions that could be at the 
source of the empirical ambiguities and lack of robustness of existing empirical analyses. 
 
We alternatively consider two types of economies: (A) A “poor” economy where the capital market 
is not well developed and where only the state is allowed to invest in human capital. The main 
implication of the former assumption is that the household-producer and enterprise sectors are only 
connected via the labor market. Capital flows between the two sectors are not possible or are 
severely restricted. (B) A “middle-income” economy which is identical to the poor one except that 
the capital market is assumed to be well developed and that the human capital sector is open to the 
for-profit private sector.  It turns out that these two distinctions between poor and middle income 
are of great significance for the evaluation of the effects of shocks affecting the economy, including 
the effects of disasters
6.    
 
A main reason to allow for this dichotomy is based on recent empirical evidence which suggests that 
the impact of disasters is linked quite closely to the existence of capital markets.  Micro studies of 
rural households by Carter et. al. (2007), Gitter and Barham (2007), and Jayachandran (2006), for 
example, have found that when capital markets are well developed the economic effects of disaster 
shocks tend to be smaller than when they are imperfect or non-existent.        
 
The model considers the existence of three productive sectors in the economy, a household-producer 
sector, an enterprise sector, and a sector producing human capital. The  household-producer sector has two 
characteristics: (i) it produces natural resource-intensive commodities using labor-intensive 
technologies; (ii) the household-producers are generally poor, many of them operating near a 
subsistence threshold caused by non-convexities associated with the existence of minimum 
subsistence consumption limits and/or with ecological irreversibility limits.      
 
                                                            
6 As can be seen in Table 11, there is a great diversity among developing countries on the participation of the private 
sector in the provision of education, from levels below 7% of the total school enrollment in countries such as Perú to 
over 33% in Korea.          
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Consistent with Stylized Fact 3, the household-producer sector is mainly located in rural areas 
spread across a wide geographic area. This means that a particular disaster may not affect all 
households with the same intensity. To capture this we assume that the N household-producers are 
distributed in two separate geographic regions.  This allows for a disaster to have differential effects 
upon the households located in each of the two regions.  
 
The enterprise sector constitutes the modern sector of the economy which produces industrial goods 
and services (i.e., financial services, retailing, etc.) that are mainly capital intensive.  To sharpen the 
focus of the analysis, we assume that this sector is not directly dependent on natural resources.  
Moreover, consistent with to empirical fact 3 in Section I, the enterprise sector tends to be much 
more concentrated geographically than the household-producer sector; to emphasize this important 
distinction, we assume that the enterprise sector is located in just one geographic area.   
 
In the poor economy case the household-producer sector is linked to the enterprise sector 
exclusively through the labor market as household members work both on their own operations as 
well as salaried workers in the enterprise sector.  In the middle income economy case the links 
between the household sector and the rest of the economy occur not only through the labor market 




In the poor economy the human capital sector is mainly in the hands of the state who invests part of 
the tax revenues on equipment and materials for schools, universities, hospitals and related activities 
and in hiring manpower.  In the middle economy with effective capital markets, the private sector 
also contributes to the production of human capital in an important way.  This sector produces new 
human capital, part of which replaces the human capital depreciated in each period and part of it 
may contribute to net increases in human capital. We follow Lucas (1988) and many others in 
assuming that human capital increases the effective manpower time. Increasing human capital is as if 
the number of effective hours of work of the labor force increased. That is, human capital is labor 
augmenting, with the effect of increasing the wage per hour if labor markets are competitive as we 
                                                            
7 In this case the household-producers can freely invest in bonds issued by the rest of the economy but their borrowing 
is subject to rationing (more on this issue below).       
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assume. To focus the analysis on the role of human capital, we assume that the total (physical) labor 
force is exogenous but the effective labor force is endogenous and may increase as human capital 
increases.     
 
We assume that the economy is small and open to international trade in goods but not in primary 
factors of production. The main implication of this is that the prices of the various outputs 
produced as well as traded intermediate inputs are exogenously given. Domestic factor prices are, 
however, endogenously determined within the economy. International labor migration may occur 
but we assume that migration flows are constrained so that domestic factor prices are nonetheless 
endogenous.    
 
The household-producer sector 
Production activities. Households produce primary commodities ( A Q ) combining man-made capital 
and labor with natural resources: 
 
(1)                                                    (, ) AA A Qn F k h l  ,    
 
where  n is the stock of renewable natural resources;  A k  and  A l  are the levels of household capital 
and labor, respectively; h 1  is a labor efficiency (or labor “augmentation”) factor related to the 
level of human capital (see below for more details on this); the function 
11 (, ) AA Fk h l  is assumed to be 
increasing, concave and linearly homogenous. The production function (1) corresponds to the 
specification often used in the literature of renewable natural resources (Schaeffer, 1957, Gordon 
1954).  For a given stock of natural resources, n, the level of production is proportional to the level 
of effort represented by (, ) AA Fk h l . 
 
Resource dynamics. The stock of renewable resources is not necessarily constant; its dynamics is of 
course affected by the level of output extracted as follows:  
 




where  () gn is the rate of natural renewal of the resource and 10  is a parameter reflecting the 
impact which production has on the natural resource.  The natural renewal function is subject to 
threshold effect;  () 0 gn n  , where n is the minimum level of the natural resource stock that 
allows its regeneration.  We use a generalization of the popular logistic specification of the natural 
resource renewable function that allows for irreversible threshold to occur at positive levels of n 
(Clark, 1990), 
 
(2’)                                            
2
12 0 gnn      , 
 
where  i  (i=1,2,3) are all positive parameters. The logistic specification used in the literature assumes 
that 0 0   , which seems like an innocuous assumption but effectively it precludes the possibility 
that the natural resource be affected by irreversible thresholds at positive levels of n.  The natural 
























where  n is the minimum threshold limit so that if nn   the system cannot recover, and n  is the 
maximum carrying capacity.  It is clear from (2’’) that nn 
8.     
 
We assume that property rights on the natural resource are not defined which means that 
households exploit the resource in open access. This implies that households do not care about the 
impacts of their decisions on the evolution of the natural resource stock, but of course the evolution 
of the natural resource impacts their productivity.  
 
Household revenue. Households maximize revenues conditional on a given stock of productive capital. 
Households’ capital is fixed in the short run but they can affect capital stocks over the intermediate 
                                                            
8 In the conventional logistic specification (with  0 0   ) it follows that   0 n  and  12 / n    .       
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run through investment. The revenues obtained by the households are also affected by the stock of 
natural resources. Finally, households have access to the labor market and thus the opportunity cost 
of their labor (in efficiency units) is equal to the prevailing market wage rate, w. That is, w is the 
marginal value product per efficiency work time, hl , and thus the wage per actual time of work is wh.  
 
We can now define a revenue function for the household-producer conditional on particular levels 
of n and  A k assuming that the household optimally chooses the level of labor used (which is not of 
course necessarily equal to its own labor supply as it can freely be a net buyer or seller of labor):  
 




R pnF k hl whl r np w k    
 
where  p is the commodity output price. R  is thus the total revenue accruing to the stock of capital 
owned by the household.  
 
Given that the function  (, ) AA Fk h l is linearly homogenous, the revenue function is a linear function 
of the total capital stock,  (, ) A rn pwk. The function r ( ) can be interpreted as the returns per unit of 
capital, which must be increasing in the output prices and decreasing in the wage rate, homogenous 
of degree one and convex in its arguments (Diewert, 1981 ). We note the particular way in which the 
stock of the natural resources, n, enters into the revenue function, which means that the revenue 
function is increasing in the stock of natural resource.   
 
Geography and the aggregate revenue function.  Households are located in two regions. The sector’s capital 
stock is thus distributed between say regions 1 and 2. The total number of households is N of which 
a proportion   is located in region 1 and 1    in region 2.  Without loss of generality we pick the 
units so that N=1. Thus, we can represent the aggregate capital stock of the two regions as 
12 (1 ) A AA kk k    , where 
i
A k , i=1,2 are the stocks of capital owned by the producers in each 
region. We assume that producers in each region have identical production functions and, prior to 




i r  (i=1,2) are identical across regions. Hence, the total revenue of the two regions combined, 
11 2 2 (.) (.)(1 ) (.) , A AA rk r k r k   is precisely equal to R as defined in (3).      
               
Output supply and the demand for effective labor. As shown by Diewert (1981), the so-called Hotellings 
lemma applies, meaning that the optimal output supply and labor demand functions can be directly 
derived from the revenue function as, 
 
(4)                    1(, ) A A Q r np w Ank        
 
(5)                    A hl 2(, ) A rn p w k  , 
 
where  (1 , 2 ) j rj   indicate first derivatives with respect to the corresponding argument. We note 
that  A hl  is the total labor in efficiency units used by the households, which may be higher or lower 
than the total labor available in the household (which we denote as A hL ) depending on whether the 
household is a net buyer or net seller of labor.  However, the household sector as a whole must be a 
net seller of labor as it supplies the labor used by the rest of the economy. Thus, using the parable of 
the representative household we assume that  A A Ll  .   Convexity of the revenue function implies 
that  ii r >0 which in turn means that the output supply functions are increasing in their respective 
output prices and that the labor demand is decreasing in the wage rate.  
 
Household income and capital accumulation. The household’s income is comprised by the returns to its 
capital ( (, ) A rn pwk) plus the returns to its owned labor, A whL , minus the net (lump-sum) taxes that 
it pays.  The total labor time of the household is equal to the total household time, L, minus the 
portion of the household time that is devoted to acquiring new skills,  H l ; thus  A H LL l . By the 
time being we consider  H l  and hence  A L  as given, but in the next section we study how  H l  is 
determined. Thus, the total household income is  
 




Where  T  a lump-sum tax is collected on the household-producers; T is equal to the total lump sum 
taxes collected by the government throughout the economy, and  is the fraction of the total tax 
revenues which the household-producer sector is required to contribute.  In (6) the term  H Ll  is 
the total labor time that the households devote to work for the rest of the economy as salaried 
workers. That is,    H Ll  = ET A lll , where  E l is the work time in the enterprise sector and  T l is 
the work time spent in the human capital producing sector.   The household may use this income to 
consume and invest any surplus left to increase its capital stock, 
 
(7)               (, ) ( ) AA H k A kr n p w kw h L l k T c        , 
 
where  c is  household consumption expenditure,  A k   is the net change of capital per unit of time, 
and  k   is the rate of capital depreciation
9. The term  () H wh L l   is the total wage income that the 
household obtains as salaried workers in the other two sectors of the economy.    
We assume the following simple dynamic forh, 
 
 (7’)                                                  H h hB h l h    , 
 
whereB >0 is a fixed parameter and  h  is the rate of depreciation of human capital. This is quite a 
standard formulation for the dynamics of human capital consistent for example with that in Lucas 
(1988).  
 
Subsistence. Households need a minimum level of consumption expenditures to survive. The level of 
subsistence expenditures and the composition of the subsistence consumption bundle naturally 
depend on the commodity prices. We denote the subsistence expenditure as (,) vpq, where qis the 
price of industrial goods and services. This subsistence expenditure is of course increasing in the 
                                                            
9 The household is assumed to have no other instruments where to place its savings, so household savings can only be 
invested in its own physical capital. Below we see that when capital markets exist the households can also invest part or 
its entire savings in bonds issued by other sectors of the economy.       
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commodity prices. Thus, the household will strive to achieve a consumption level cv   and will be 
willing to disinvest in  A k  to reach such critical level if necessary.  Subsistence households may also 
resort to reduce investment in human capital by cutting  H l  and thus increase  A L  and consequently 
current labor income. That is, student household members may have to drop out of school in order 
to devote more time to work and thus allow the household extra income to prevent its consumption 
to fall below minimum consumption levels.         
 
Household utility function.   We assume that the household’s utility function is increasing, strictly 
concave, and homothetic in the consumption of the three commodities (including the industrial 
good produced by the enterprise sector).  The indirect household utility function can thus be 
represented as  ,, [ ( () ) / () ] uc vp q ep q  , where  (,) epqis a cost of living index which transform 
consumption expenditures into real consumption (Diewert, 1981). Note that u has to be non-
negative which requires that cv  , that is, that the household must at least be at the subsistence 
level.    
 
The household’s choice of investment and consumption.   The household is assumed to choose an optimal 
investment path given initial conditions. This is equivalent to choosing the consumption path over 
time by maximizing the present value of its utility function, 
  
(8)                 
0
(,)








    
Subject to: Equations (7) and (7’); and to the initial levels of the assets, 
(0) ; AA kk    (0) nn  ; h (0) h  , where  is the household discount rate. 
 
We note that the dynamics of the natural resource is not considered in this optimization due to the 
fact that the natural resources are subject to open access. Of course the evolution of the natural 
resource will affect the future choices, but the issue is that current choices are not affected by the 
future state of the natural resource.   
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Household capital, unlike natural resources, is subject to well-defined property rights so the 
household has tenure security over it. Also, the evolution of household capital, unlike the evolution 
of human capital, depends on the household investment decisions. The Hamiltonian of this problem 
is, 
 
(9)        
(.)
max (.) AA k A c
cv
ur k w h L k T c
e
 
         
+ [] H h Bhl    , 
 
Where,    and   are the co-state variables representing the shadow values of physical and human 
capital, respectively.  First order conditions are the following: 
 
(10)    (i) 
'(.)/ ue    if  (.); cv   or  (.), cv   otherwise 
(ii)  0; Bw      ( H l )0 ; Bw       0 H l   
(11) (i)    (, ) AA A k A kr n p w kw h L k T c        if  (.); cv   or    
(, ) ( . ) , AA A k A kr n p w kw h L k T v        otherwise 
(ii)  H h hB h l h     if  (.); cv  or  h hh    and  0 H l  ,otherwise 
(12)    (i)        (, ) k rn pw       if  (.); cv   or  0,     otherwise 
(ii)   () ( ) hH H Blw L l          if  (.); cv  or  0     , otherwise. 
If  0 H l  then from (10ii) we have that   B w     in which case we can write (12ii) as   
(12iii)     () h BL       . 
Also by differentiating (10ii) with respect to time it follows that the rates of growth of the two co-
estate variables,  ˆ ˆ    , should be identical if households do invest in human capital, that is if 
0 H l  .  That is, using (12i) and (12iii) we have that  
 
(13)     (, ) kh rn pw B L       if  0 H l   
 
In addition, we have that the dynamics of the natural resource will influence the evolution of  A k  and 




(14)     1 () ( , ) A ng n k r n p w n      if nn  ;    and    0 n   if nn    
 
We first consider the solution for the steady state and then we analyze the out-of-steady-state 
dynamics of the system 
 
Steady state solution. We first consider the case where the household is able to achieve consumption 
levels above subsistence and the stock of the natural resource is above its threshold limit (cv   and 
nn   ).  A natural definition of the steady state is the state when the following conditions hold: 
0 n   and  ˆ ˆ    . Thus in steady state we need that 
 
(15)              
* (, )kh rnpw B L      
 
That is, in steady state the marginal rate of return to physical capital net of depreciation should be 
equal to the marginal returns to human capital.  There is a unique level of the resource stock, 
*, n  at 
which the above condition is satisfied. Suppose that initially 
*
0 nn  so that 
0 (, )kh rnpw B L    . This would be a signal to continue expanding  A k  (and not investing in 
hso that the savings to spend in physical capital investment is higher) but as  A k  rises production of 
the commodity increases and the stock of n falls, which in turn reduces the returns to physical 
capital, r . This process continues until the above condition is satisfied as equality. This relationship 
is graphically depicted in the lower panel of Figure 1. The second vertical line in the top panel of 
Figure 1 shows the  0 k    schedule. 
  
From equation (14) it follows that  0 n    if     
 







1(, ) A krnpw  . 
       
 
22
This equation when evaluated at the steady state level of n yields a unique level of capital, 
*
A k , which 
is consistent with a stable level of the natural resource. If households were to increase  A k  beyond 
*
A k , for example, the stock of n would fall which in turn would cause the rate of return to capital to 
decrease upsetting condition (15), which would induce households to disinvest in physical capital. 
The stock of physical capital would thus return to its equilibrium level. From (14) and (14’) it is clear 
that the steady state levels of the stock of physical capital and stock of natural resources are 
functions of the output prices and of the wage rate. Since we assume throughout that the output 
prices are fixed, we just write the steady state stocks for each region as explicit functions of w, 
 
(14’’)   (i)   
* ()
i
A kw    or 
* 0
i
A k    if cv  (if subsistence applies) for i=1,2;   
           (ii) 
* ()
i nw   or 
* i nn   if cv  (if subsistence applies) for i=1,2 
 
From (14) and (15) it follows that the steady state capital stock is decreasing in wand the steady 
state level of natural resource is increasing in w; that is,  () 0 w    and  () 0 w    .   
 
Finally, evaluating (11i) at the steady state levels of the assets stocks (and thus using  0 A k   ) we can 
solve for the steady state level of consumption expenditures,    
 
(16)               
** * * (, ) ( ) AH k A cr n p w kw h L l T k       . 
 
The steady level of household consumption defined in (16) is conditional on the level of h as well 
as on the level of household time spent in building human capital ( H l ). Since, as we shall see, even 
when the steady state h is increasing, labor income is growing indefinitely and therefore over the 
long run the households are able to increase consumption over time.   That is, the actual household 
consumption may not be constant over the long run. Note, however, that Equations (15) and (14’) 
are not affected by hand H l , which means that, unlike
* c , the levels of  
* n and 
*
A k  are in fact fixed 
over the long run.    
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Convergence. We first assume that the initial endowment of physical and natural capitals of the 
household sector economy is initially above the SS subsistence curve and sufficiently to the right of 
the  n vertical line (Figure 1).  It is easy to show that given a level of wthe system converges to the 
long run equilibrium described above (we defer the discussion of the determination of w and 
H l which of course depends on economy wide conditions). Suppose that initially 
* nn  then we have 
that  (, ) k rnpw B L   and consequently  A k will be increasing.  As  A k rises over time production of 
the commodity expands increasing the extraction of the natural resource eventually overcoming its 
capacity to renew itself. At this point the natural resource declines over time; but as nfalls the rate 
of return to capital falls and hence the incentives to continue expanding capital decline and the stock 
of the resource approaches the long run equilibrium level,  * n . This transitional dynamics and 
convergence is illustrated in Figure 1. We note that the main reason why the system converges 
towards a zero output growth steady state is that the natural resource is fixed in the long run. This 
causes the rate of return to capital to fall as long as the natural resource declines towards its fixed 
long run equilibrium level. Any further expansion of the household production levels becomes 
unsustainable as it reduces the resource stock below the required level to make the rate of return to 
household capital attractive enough to continue investing.    
 
We say that natural resources are abundant (scarce) when 
* nn   (
* nn  ). Then we have the 
following important result for the out-of-steady dynamics:  When natural resources are abundant (scarce) 
the households net invest only in physical capital (human capital). Thus, natural resources are complement 
with physical capital and substitutes with human capital. Human capital abundance acts as a 
disincentive to invest in human capital and as an incentive to expand physical capital. Of course in 
the steady state (i.e., when 
* nn  ) the household continues to increase human capital while keeps 
the stock of physical capital constant.     
 
Subsistence equilibrium. The above is the solution assuming that the household is able to achieve 
consumption levels above the subsistence level. Here we look at the subsistence equilibrium. The 
subsistence steady state is depicted by the subsistence line characterized by  0 AH kl    even if 
kh rB L    . That is, a subsistence household is not able to invest in neither form of capital. 
Investment is constrained by the capacity of the household to save, not by the profitability of       
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investment. The boundary between subsistence and non-subsistence equilibrium is given by the 
curve depicting the budget constraint evaluated at  0 AH kl     and  (.) cv  : 
 
(17)               (, ) ( . )0 Ak A rn pwk w h L k T v        
 
with slope,  
 









 if r   .        
 
This downward sloping curve is shown as the line SS in Figure 1. This line shows all the possible 
combinations of n and  A k that allow for the household consumption level to be exactly equal to its 
subsistence level, i.e, for c   .  The position of the subsistence curve SS is not necessarily fixed. If, 
for example, h increases the SS curve would shift down.  Figure 1 also shows the Ecological 
Fragility Zone (EFZ) defined as the area when the level of the natural resource is between n and 
1/2
2 [/] o   and above the  0 n   curve. If the system is in EFZ the subsequent dynamics of the 
system may lead to levels of n below n which implies the eventual extinction of the resource. 
 
Any point along the SS curve implies that consumption is exactly equal to the subsistence level and 
that both physical and human capitals are constant. If the initial combination of the stock of physical 
capital and natural resources is at or below this line the household would not be able to achieve the 
steady state (
** , kn ) discussed earlier. If initially the household availability of assets is along line SS 
the household would remain at subsistence as long as exogenous conditions do not change.  If the 
resource endowment falls below the SS line the household falls into a spiraling poverty trap; the 
household becomes destitute and is condemned to subsist out of social programs or charity. 
Similarly, any point below n implies that the ecological system cannot resist any resource extraction 
because it is unable to renew itself.  Also any point within the EFZ may lead to extinction of the 
resource which means that eventually a household may fall into the poverty trap even if initially the 




Summary:  The representative household of the economy supplies labor to the household production sector as well as 
to the rest of the economy (the enterprise sector and the human capital production sector). In addition, the household 
sector devotes part of its time to schooling and other learning activities which enhance the future stock of human capital  
( H l ).  The main finding so far is that non-subsistence households reach a fixed long-run level of physical capital and 
that the dynamics of the natural resource and household behavior lead to an also fixed level of the natural resource over 
the long run. A long-run equilibrium condition is that the net marginal returns to investing in physical capital should 
be equal to the net marginal returns investing in human capital. However, the solution to the household optimization 
problem does not explicitly determines the optimal level of  H l (except of course when the household is in state of 
subsistence in which case we have shown that  0 H l  ) and also we have taken was given.  
 
To determine the equilibrium levels of the investment in human capital ( H l ) and of the wage rate 
per efficiency labor we need to explicitly consider the rest of the economy and the equilibrium of the 
labor market. We now turn to these issues.            
 
The Enterprise Sector 
 
The enterprise sector is constituted by the modern sector producing mainly industrial goods and 
services which are assumed to be not directly dependent of natural resources as factors of 
production. In contrast to the household-producer sector, this sector is dominated by capitalist 
firms. The production function in this sector is 
 
(19)                                    (, , ) M MM Qg k Z h l  , 
 
where  M Q  and  M k  are output produced and capital owned by the enterprises respectively, Z  are 
imported intermediate inputs used by this sector,  M hl  is labor in efficiency units. We assume that 
production is subject to constant returns to scale or, equivalently, that the function  (, , ) MM gk Zh l  is 
linearly homogenous.  
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The returns to capital or profits in this sector are defined as,    
 
(20)         
, max ( , , ) ( , , )
M
MM M M lZqg k Z hl zZ whl k q z w      , 
 
where  q and z are the prices for output and intermediate goods, respectively. Given the constant 
returns to scale assumption optimal profits in this sector are linear in  M k  and there is a unit profit 
function,  , which is linearly homogenous, increasing in q and decreasing in z  and w, and convex 
in its arguments (Diewert, 1981).  Moreover Hotellings lemma applies which means that  
 
(21)           (i)  M Q =  1(,, ) M kq z w  ;  (ii)Z  2(,, ) M kq z w   ;   (iii)  M hl  3(,, ) M kq z w   , 
 
where  (1 , 2 , 3 ) i i   denote first derivatives with respect to the corresponding argument. 
 
Like household producers, capitalists are assumed to choose their investment and consumption 
patterns optimally to maximize the expected present value of their utility, which in turn is an 
increasing and strictly concave function of their consumption,  k c .  We assume that, in contrast with 
the household producers, the capitalists in the enterprise sector rely exclusively on hired workers (or 
that their own work time is a negligible fraction of the total labor force).        
 












    
      Subject to:  
       (,, ) ( 1 ) M Mk M k kq z w k k T c         
                     (0) M M kk   
 
where  (1 )T   is the contribution to the total tax revenues of the enterprise sector (the policy 
coefficient  is of course positive and less than one). Firms take  , qz  and w as given. The first 




(23)     (.)/ k ue      
 
(24)     (,, ) ( 1 ) M Mk M k kq z w k k T c         
 
(25)       (,, ) kk k qzw       , 
 
where  k   is the shadow price of capital.  
 
This problem can be called a pseudo Ak type as the solution to the above problem allows firms to 
immediately reach a steady state path without transitional dynamics (see below however why we call 
it a pseudo Ak model). If the economy is sufficiently productive and if input prices are not too high 
and constant over time, the steady state may be consistent with a permanent increase in the stock of 
capital, output and consumption as in the conventional Rommer’s Ak model (Romer, 1986, 1987). 
Differentiating (23) with respect to time and using (25) we obtain the optimal growth rate of capital 
and consumption,   
 
(26)                 
1 ˆ ˆ (,, ) ( ) kM k ck q z w
a









 is the elasticity of marginal utility assumed positive and constant and a “hat” 
above the symbols represents growth rates over time.  Also, given that industrial output is 
1(.) M M Qk   , we have that the rate of growth of output is also constant as long as output and 
input prices are constant, 
 
(27)                                 ˆ ˆ
M M Qk   
 
That is, consumption of capitalists, the stock of capital and production in the enterprise sector all 
grow at a constant rate which is positive provided that the economy is sufficiently productive so that       
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the marginal value product of capital,  , is above the opportunity cost of capital,    .  This is in 
sharp contrast to the primary or household-producer sector which over the long run the steady state 
is one of a constant level of output, capital and consumption. The main reason is that the 
household-producer sector is dependent on a natural resource with a given renewal capacity. This 
means that unlike the enterprise sector, capital and production in the household-producer sector 
cannot expand indefinitely.  
 
Growth vs stagnation of the enterprise sector. Even the enterprise sector can be subject to limits to growth 
if the wage rate per unit of efficiency labor, w, increases over time.  As can be seen in (26) if the 
expansion of the enterprise sector leads to increasing w, the returns to capital,  , will progressively 
fall (remember that  is decreasing in w) eventually becoming equal to the opportunity cost of 
capital at which point the enterprise sector would also stagnate and therefore the economy as a 
whole would stagnate as well. However, stagnation can be prevented under certain conditions, 
allowing the growth process to remain positive and constant as in the so-called AK model. This is 
why we called this model a pseudo AK .  Below we examine the conditions for preventing the 
growth rate to decline towards zero over time.    
 
Summary: Unlike the case of the household physical capital investment and output levels, physical capital investment 
and production levels of the enterprise sector can under certain conditions continuously expand over the long run.  
Whether or not the enterprise economy stagnates depends on whether or not the increased demand for labor (in efficiency 
units) generated by the enterprise sector is off-set by a constant increase in the supply of labor efficiency.  That is, the 
rate of growth of human capital as a source of increasing supply of labor efficiency is a key factor. If human capital 
grows at a sufficiently rapid pace to off-set the increased demand for efficiency labor then the efficiency wage rate does not 
need to increase and a constant growth rate of the enterprise sector and for the economy can be supported indefinitely. 
Otherwise, the economy will slow down and eventually stagnate.   
 
Thus, the key aspects of growth are to be found in the labor market and in the supply of new human 
capital. We first consider the issue of the supply of new human capital.  
 
At this point we need to distinguish the two types of economy considered, first the case of a poor 
economy which has imperfect capital market with the state producing all new human capital and,       
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subsequently the middle income economy   with perfect capital markets and where the private sector may 
produce new human capital. 
 
A. The Poor Economy 
 
The human capital sector 
 
We assume that new human capital for the labor force is provided by the state. The state uses part 
of the tax revenues to produce human capital. The state uses a proportion   of the total tax 
revenues to provide new human capital.  Governments of course use many types of taxes; most of 
them cause distortions by affecting investments and other forms of resource allocation. Since the 
focus of this analysis is not on the consequences of taxes, we assume that taxes are raised via lump-
sum taxes applied to both the household-producers and to the enterprise sector.  In the context of 
small open economies where final good prices are fixed, the lump sum tax resembles a consumption 
tax. The total tax revenue devoted by the government to produce human capital is  T  , where 
0< <1 is a policy parameter.  
 
The supply of new human capital is postulated to follow the following dynamic, 
 
(28)                               (, )
S
hT h hH Z h l h    , 
 
where  (.) H  is a production function for new human capital as a function of the materials and 
effective labor used in the production of human capital ( h Z  and  T hl  respectively) and  h   is the rate 
of depreciation of human capital. Thus,  T l is the teacher time as provided by the households that are 
(partly) employed by the human capital sector.   
 
Using the expenditures  T   the government buys the services of labor as well as imported materials 
and equipment to produce human capital. We assume that the materials and equipment components       
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are imported by the government
10.  We note that the production of human capital, unlike the 
production of other goods and services, tend to have a very low elasticity of substitution between 
equipments and labor. To capture this we assume that production of human capital can be 
characterized by a fixed proportions or Leontief technology
11.  Thus, we have 
 
(29)                          
12
min( , )





where  h Z  are the specialized imported materials used in human capital production,  T l  is the labor 
used producing human capital,   is a parameter reflecting total factor productivity in producing 
human capital, and  i   (i=1,2) are fixed coefficients. Thus, efficient production of human capital 
requires that  12 (/) hT Z hl    . This means that the total cost of producing human capital is, 
 
(30)                            12 (( / ) ) Th T whl zZ w z hl      
 
The total cost of producing human capital is equal to the government’s budget for education,  T  . 
Equalizing government expenditures in education and the education budget solves for the level of 
labor used in education, 
 












The level of imported materials used can also be obtained using the condition  12 (/) hT Z hl     
presented above. Using (31) in (29) we get, 
 
                                                            
10 We also assume that there is a mass of people, mainly children outside the labor force, that are available to receive 
instruction which eventually replaces part of the retiring component of the labor force once their education process 
ends.      
11 This assumption simplifies the ensuing analysis but it does not condition the results.       
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Hence, from (28) it follows that the rate of growth of the supply of new human capital is,   
 







- h  . 
 
Equation (33) provides a very reasonable representation of the supply of new human capital by the 
government: it is increasing in the volume of financial resources that the government devotes to 
human capital ( T  ) and in the productivity of such resources( ) and is decreasing in the prices of 
the inputs needed to produce human capital (wandz ).   
 
Equation (33) represents the supply of new human capital.  Earlier we considered the demand for 
new human capital by households, Equation (7’) which we now write it explicitly as a demand 
condition,  ˆD
H h hB l   (to remind,  H l  represents the household student time). Equilibrium needs 
that  ˆD
H h = ˆS h . This equilibrium takes place via adjustments in the levels of student enrollment vis-à-
vis the level of teachers. Thus, the student-teacher ratio (/) H T ll is adjusted until supply of new 
human capital equals demand. In fact, equalizing (33) and (7’) using (31) we obtain that there is a 
fixed student/teacher ratio that allows for equilibrium, 
                    









Since  T hl is given by (31) we have that (33’) allows us to solve for the equilibrium level of  H hl .  
Thus the total level of effective time that households devote to the human capital sector including 
teachers and students is, 
 









   
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Summary: The human capital production sector in poor economies is assumed to be in the hands of the government, 
which uses part of the tax revenues to buy the necessary materials and teaching time to produce new human capital. 
Households provide both the teaching manpower as well as the student time. The total labor and student time used by 
the human capital sector is increasing in the budget allocated by the government to the sector, and is decreasing in the 
cost of the inputs used in producing human capital; it is also affected by certain key efficiency parameters.     
                                                                                          
            
Labor market equilibrium 
 
The labor market is assumed to clear at all times. That is, the wage rate per efficiency labor time, w, 
is flexible to allow the demand in efficiency units of labor to be equal to the supply of labor in 
efficiency units. The total physical labor force of the economy,L, is assumed fixed, so that the 
supply of labor efficiency units, hL , may change only if human capital rises over time. The total 
labor demand is comprised of the labor demand from the enterprise sector plus the demand from 
the household-producers sector and plus the demand for labor from the human capital production 
sector. Using the representations of labor demand in the enterprise and household-production 
sectors (equations (5) and (21.iii), respectively) and the labor demand from the human capital sector 




















*1 * 2 * (1 ) A AA kk k    . Remember that from (14’’) both 
*
A k  and 
* n are functions ofw. Thus, 
for given levels of  M k  andh, equilibrium in the labor market requires a unique level of w which we 
denote by 
e w . In addition to  M k  and h the level of 
e w  also depends on the tax rate chosen by the 
government.  Thus equation (34) solves for the remaining endogenous variable, w, as a function of 
,, M kh and the policy variable T . We can write the equilibrium wage rate as a function, 
(, , ; )
e
M ww k h T X  , where X is a binary variable equal to 1 if neither of the household-producer 
regions are in the subsistence regime, and X=0 if at least one of the household regions is under a       
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12.  It is natural to expect 
that (, , ; 1 ) (, , ; 0 ) MM wk hT wk hT  . 
 
All left-hand-side terms in (34) are decreasing in wso the effect of w on the total labor demand is 
of course negative. It is easy to see from (34) that this implies that the equilibrium wage rate is 
increasing in  M k  and decreasing in h (it is also increasing in T ),  /0
e
M wk   and  /0
e wh   .     
 
A key issue is whether or not the resulting equilibrium value of 
e w  allows the enterprise sector to 
expand. From (26) it is clear that if the marginal value product of capital when evaluated at 
e w is 
above its marginal cost, that is if  (,, )
e
k qzw   , then growth in the enterprise sector and 
hence in the economy will be positive. The question is whether this growth rate can be supported 
over time. As we have just seen,  M k  in this case increases over time, meaning that the demand for 
labor from the enterprise sector may continuously increase in a growing economy. Thus to keep the 
wage rate constant and hence for growth to remain positive it is necessary that  h increase at a 
sufficient pace. Below we consider the conditions necessary to preserve a positive growth rate. 
 
Preserving a positive and constant growth rate: The required rate of growth of human 
capital 
 
Equilibrium (34) with constant 
e w  can only be preserved if h is growing at a sufficiently fast rate. 
To determine this required rate of growth of human capital ( ˆR h ) we differentiate (34) with respect 
to time (assuming w constant) to obtain the following condition, 
 
(35)                       3 ˆˆ (.)
R
MM kk h L h   , 
 
which using (21.iii) can be written as:  
                                                            
12 The level of 
e w also depends on output and intermediate input prices which we omit from the equilibrium wage 




(36)                               ˆˆ R










   is the share of the labor force employed by the industrial sector which 
is increasing in   / M kh . 
From (36) it is clear that  ˆˆ R
M hk   and, since  M s  is an increasing function of the ratio  / M kh , the 
required rate of growth of human capital must be increasing over time getting closer to  ˆ
M k but never 
quite reaching it. The required rate of growth of h needed to sustain the rate of growth given by 
(26) is therefore: 
 






         
 
Thus, while human capital needs to grow at a slower rate than physical capital in the enterprise 
sector, the rate of growth of human capital needs to be increasing over time as  M s  grows.  
 
From (33) it is clear that the rate of growth of human capital can increase over time only if the tax 
T  or the share of government revenues devoted to human capital,  , or both, increase over time. 
Equalizing (33) and (37), we obtain the required tax revenues that the government must spend in the 












   


   . 
 
Thus, if the initial rate of growth is to be preserved, it is necessary that  T  =()
e
T   and must be 
constantly increasing over time. Expression (38) provides a very sensible rule for government 
expenditure allocation to human capital: the needed government expenditure in human capital is 




e zw    and in the rate of depreciation of human capital. It is also decreasing in the level of 
efficiency of production of human capital ( ).  
 
The previous analysis shows that sustaining a faster rate of physical capital growth requires a faster 
human capital growth rate as well.  That is, human capital and physical capital are complements 
rather than substitutes.             
 
Summary: Given initial stocks of physical and human capital, the equilibrium wage rate in the short run is 
determined by a policy decision regarding the level of tax revenues devoted to human capital production,  T  .  This, in 
turn, determines whether or not the enterprise sector will be able to grow and at what rate. It is clear from (34) that 
e w  is increasing in the tax level chosen by the government. Hence, if the government chooses a tax that is too high it 
may choke growth in the short run by inducing too high a wage rate. However, a higher level of tax revenues if 
government waste does not increase (e.g., if   does not fall) may allow for a faster growth rate of human capital which 
over time increases the effective labor supply. This, in turn, may allow for a decline in the wage rate per unit of efficiency 
time which eventually will make investment in the enterprise sector attractive again. Thus, the government spending in 
human capital is between two evils: Too high spending may cause too high wages in the short run which may dissuade 
investors thus risking stagnation; too little spending in human capital, on the other hand, may allow for lower wages in 
the short run and hence rapid investment in physical capital, but at the cost of too slow a rise in human capital which 




So far we have not explicitly referred to the required balance of trade equilibrium. In fact given the 
small open economy condition, the external equilibrium is already guaranteed by the satisfaction of 
the budget constraints of the household-producers and enterprise sectors that we assume (plus the 
assumption that tax revenues are equal to government expenditures).  See, for example, Dixit and 
Norman (1980) for a detailed discussion of these issues.   
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B. The Middle-Income Economy 
 
As discussed in the introduction of the model section, the middle income economy is assumed to 
have a well-developed capital market and the human capital sector is fully open to for-profit private 
enterprises.  The capital market is well developed in the sense that there are financial instruments by 
which the household-producer sector can invest in bonds issued by the enterprise sector.  This does 
not necessarily mean that the household-producer sector can borrow from the enterprise sector 
without limits; in fact the literature has shown the widespread prevalence of credit rationing 
affecting households and poor producers even in developed countries (Grant, 2007; Hayashi, 1987). 
We assume that the household-producers as a group cannot be net borrowers from the rest of the 
economy
13.   In any case we focus in the case where before the liberalization of the capital market 
the rate of return to capital in the household-producer sector is below the rate of return to capital in 
the enterprise sector, r   .  This is of course the interesting (and realistic) case. Given this the 
household-producer sector will want to invest in bonds, not borrow, so the assumption of credit 
rationing for the household-producer sector is really innocuous.  
 
If initially r    the household-producers devote all their savings to invest in bonds issued by the 
enterprise sector and nothing to invest in its own capital stock.  This causes their physical capital to 
decline and consequently natural capital rebuilds which, in turn, raises the returns to household 
capital over time until r   . At this point new steady state equilibrium for the sector is reached.  
Figure 2 illustrates this process. As shown in Figure 2 capital market liberalization induces a long run 
equilibrium characterized by a more abundant stock of natural resources.
14 
       
 We also assume that the government still invests in basic education just enough to prevent the 
human capital sector to fall (that is, the government contribution to human capital is equal to hh  ). 
In doing this the government uses a portion of the labor force,  hL  , where the parameter 01     
is possibly quite small. Otherwise the middle income economy is structurally identical to the poor 
economy. 
                                                            
13 This assumption is extreme but does not affect the results as long as there is binding credit rationing.  




The capital markets. As discussed above a main implication is that now the net rates of return to 
capital in the household-producer sector and enterprise sector are equalized in the long run. That is, 
in long run equilibrium we have
15, 
 
(39)                                (, ) ( , , ) rn pw qzw    
 
In addition we have that the household equilibrium allocations (15) and (14’) are still valid which for 
the sake of clarity we repeat here, 
 
(15)                       (, ) kh rnpw B L      
(14’)                       
() gn
n
= 1(, ) A krnpw  . 
 
 Equations (15) and (39) solve for the long run levels of the stock of natural resources and wage rate, 
* n  and 
* w and condition (14’) solves for the long-run equilibrium level of 
*
A k . Evaluating condition 
(14’) at the levels  * w  and  * n  yields the long run equilibrium level for the stock of capital in the 
household-producer sector, 
*
A k . 
 
Thus, the household-producer sector follows a path that is akin with the standard Swan-Solow 
model where output growth ceases over the long run. By contrast, the enterprise sector may reach 
long run equilibrium with positive output and physical capital growth like in endogenous growth 
models.  The main reason for this asymmetry in dynamic behavior is that the household-producer 
sector, unlike the enterprise sector, is constrained by the availability of the natural resources which 
has a limited capacity to regenerate itself.  Ultimately, the natural resource is fixed and this puts 
limits to output growth in that sector.  Importantly, this does not mean that the household sector 
does not benefit out of the ensuing process of economic growth. What happens is that once the 
                                                            
15 The net returns are  k r   for the household-producer sector and  k    . Since the depreciation rates are assumed 
identical in the two sectors we get (14’) below.           
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level of physical capital  A k stops growing the households shift their savings to invest in financial 
assets issued by the enterprise sector obtaining a net rate of return equal to  k    (of course this 
assumes that there are no financial intermediaries; in the real world households get a somehow lower 
return by paying intermediation fees).           
 
Labor market equilibrium.  Labor market equilibrium now defines the equilibrium level of  H l  because 
equilibrium in the capital market already defines a unique wage rate consistent with it. The labor 
market condition thus needs to be interpreted differently, 
 
(34’)        
**
32 ( ,,* ) ( ,* ) ( 1 ) MA H qzw k r npw k h l h L      , 
 
We note in (34’) that (1 )hL   is the effective labor supply to the private sector once the 
government employment is deducted.  Given  M k  and h, which are fixed in a particular point of 
time (the economy can affect the rates of change of these assets but not their level at a point in 
time), the level of  H l  is determined.  This means that given an initial level of the level of hthe rate 
of change of human capital is determined; which using (7’) is equal to H h Bl   .  But it is possible 
that the levels of initial asset endowments,  M k  and h as well as n, are such that (34’) does not 
satisfy the non-negativity constraint in which case  0 H l  . In this case the economy is unable of 
investing in new human capital (just the replacement human capital is produced by the 
government)
16.   
 
This means that for human capital to be increasing over time we need that h be greater than a 
critical level, 
c h    
 




[( , , * ) ( , * )]
(1 )
c








16 If the government provided less than the replacement of human capital   0 H l   would not be sufficient for human 




Bifurcation and state dependence 
 
In part depending on initial state conditions (i.e., factor endowments) the system bifurcates into two 
possible long run equilibrium solutions:   
 
(i) An interior solution with equations (14’), (15) and (39) uniquely solving for the long run 
constant levels of 
** , A nk and 
* w .  If the initial endowments of  M k and  h are favorable, that is if 
such endowment allow condition (40) to be satisfied, the labor market equation (34’) evaluated at 
** , A nk and 
* w may solve for a unique temporary value of  H l >0.  If when evaluated at the equilibrium 
wage rate 
* (,, ) k qzw   then  M k and  hwill both grow continuously over time and  H l will 
adjust accordingly as required by the labor market clearing condition (34’). The expansion of both 
M k and hmay allow the economy to continuously grow over time.   
 
(ii) A corner solution, where evaluating the labor market equilibrium (34’) at 
** , A nk and 
* w  would 
only be consistent with a negative value for  H l in which case the non-negativity constraint for  H l  is 
binding and we have a corner solution 0 H l  , implying that human capital cannot grow. This is the 
case when the initial level of  M k is too high vis-à-vis the level of h so that condition (40) is not 
satisfied.  When the non-negativity constraint for  H l is binding it effectively means that the wage rate 
must increase above 
* w to clear the labor market. Let’s denote this higher wage by w  and denote 
as
0 w the wage rate that makes
0 (,, ) k qzw     .  If 
0 ww   then at  M k will be increasing which 
given that  0 h    means that the labor demand will increase over time while the efficiency labor 
supply remains constant. That is, if condition (40) fails at the initial factor endowments it will also 
subsequently fail as  M k increases and h does not.  The wage rate continuously increases over time 
until it reaches
0 w . At that point  M k  stops growing and we get a new equilibrium altogether with 
solution
00 , A nk, 
0
M k  and 
0 w  (and H l 0  ) obtained solving (39), (14’), (34’), and the new condition       
 
40
0 (,, ) k qzw   
17.  The capital market condition (15) does not hold anymore as  0 H l  which 
means that (15) becomes an inequality (
00 (, ) kh rnpw B L     The economy is in the long run 
unable to expand both h and  M k which means that it stagnates. Moreover, it can easily be shown 
that the long run equilibrium level of natural resources in a stagnant economy is higher (lower) than 
in a growing economy, that is, 
0* nn  , if the household-producer sector production is more labor 
intensive than the enterprise sector production.   
 
The human capital paradox.  If the corner solution equilibrium is reached the system cannot escape it 
unless exogenous changes happen.  Here is the apparent paradox: since 
0* ww  the corner solution 
equilibrium implies that the rate of return to investing in human capital is high (as human capital is 
scarce) and above the rate of return to investing in physical capital (that is, condition (15) is in this 
case an inequality).  Yet rational investors do not invest in new human capital. The reason is that 
potential investors in human capital know that if human capital starts accumulating the rate of return 
to human capital would gradually have to fall in the future as the wage rate falls towards
* w . But this 
implies large capital losses to investors in human capital. In fact, given an initial equilibrium
00 , A nk, 
0
M k  the wage rate would have to shoot up above 
0 w in the short run to accommodate a positive 
level of  H l that investing in new human capital needs.  This additional wage increase and hence 
additional expected capital losses for human capital investors is what tilt the balance against 
investing in new human capital
18.      
   
Long-run stagnation.  The corner solution described above show the conditions under which the 
system converges towards stagnation.  The higher is the initial stock of  M k  and the lower is the 
                                                            
17 The reader can verify that if 
0 ww   then  ˆ 0 M k   until the wage rate reaches 
0 w at which point the system also 
reaches a no growth steady state.  
18 The human capital paradox is not merely an intellectual curiosity. High rates of return to human capital especially in 
middle income countries (way above rates of return to physical or financial assets) are frequently reported in the 
literature (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002; Palacios-Huerta, 2003; and Jacobs 2007) and yet these countries seem to 
systematically under invest in human capital as shown, for example, by high and increasing international cognitive test 
score gaps with developed countries (López and Miller 2008, López and Islam 2008).         
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initial stock of h, the more likely is that condition (40) does not hold; that is, the more likely is that 
the economy be unable to increase human capital. A human capital stagnation trap ensues, which 
subsequently leads to economic stagnation. In fact, this process causes excess demand for effective 
labor (the labor markets ceases to clear at * w ) which is solve by an equally continuous rise of  w  
until
0 (,, ) k qzw   , where
0 * ww 
19. At this point the whole economy stagnates.  
 
Long-run growth. The interior solution described above steers the system to permanent growth. If the 
initial asset endowments are favorable, in the sense h is higher and/or k is sufficiently low so that 
condition (40) is met, then the labor market equilibrium would be consistent with 0 H l  . In this case 
the economy is constantly able to increase human capital. It can be shown that the economy 
continues increasing human capital indefinitely.  That is, if initially the asset endowments allows for 
a net growth of human capital a state of accumulation of human capital with a constant growth rate 
will persist indefinitely.  The economy is able to reach long run equilibrium with permanent growth.   
 
Summary: An economy that in the past has over invested in physical capital and under invested in human capital 
faces a high risk of becoming unable to maintain a positive rate of economic growth.  By contrast, a relative abundance 
of human capital vis-à-vis physical capital increases the likelihood that the economy will be able to sustain a positive 
rate of economic growth over the long run.  
      
 
IV. EFFECTS OF A DISASTER SHOCK 
 
Disasters can affect this economy through a variety of channels, including the levels of productivity 
of each sector, it could cause disruptions in the provision of intermediate inputs and materials 
causing increases of their prices, z , affecting primarily the enterprise and human capital sectors.  
 
                                                            
19 The fact that the wage per efficiency labor increases is of course due to the scarcity of human capital that the lack of 
net investment in human capital induces. Compared to a case where human capital does expand workers may be better 
off in the latter case as the wage per actual work time, wh, would be increasing. In both cases the wage per actual time 
increases over time, but the difference is that when human capital does not grow the wage growth is merely temporary 
stagnating over the long run, while the wage increases are permanent in the case where human capital expands.            
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The disaster can also devastate the stocks of productive assets,  , A k  n, and  M k  which affect not only 
the productive capacity of the various sectors but also the demand for labor pushing down real 
wages. The fall in wages, or more generally of incomes, can have significant and contradictory 
implications for the medium term growth of the economy: Lower wages may be an incentive for the 
enterprise sector to increase its investment rate which may contribute to off-set or more than off-set 
capital losses in such sector. Thus, in the short run we may expect an acceleration of economic growth.   
 
However, the fall of incomes can have dramatically negative effects over the intermediate run. 
Governments are likely to receive political pressures to cut taxes to alleviate the affected sectors and 
at the same time to allocate more government expenditures towards infrastructure. In the absence of 
significant foreign aid, the government may be forced to reduce the share of spending in the 
operation of the human capital production sector (although part of the increased spending in 
infrastructure could go to the human capital sector). As is illustrated in Table 5, governments often 
change their public spending patterns in a dramatic way after disasters. The tendency towards 
crowding out operational expenditures in favor of capital spending has been empirically documented 
by Benson and Clay (2004) among others.  This reallocation of government expenditures often result 
in significant disruptions in the provision of human capital (Molina et al., 2009).  That is, often both 
T  and   fall which cause a deceleration of the rate of accumulation of human capital. After a few 
years this may be reflected in a reduction of the stock of human capital which will, in turn, imply 
that the initial increases in the rate of physical capital accumulation in the enterprise sector cannot be 
supported and such rate may fall to levels even below those prior to the disaster.  
 
Moreover, the initial fall in wages may cause part of the household sector to fall into a poverty trap 
which eventually may disappear as a production sector and hence be unable to retain workers. The 
workers released by the household-producer sector would put further pressures on wages as they 
become landless workers.  These are just examples of the many mechanisms by which a disaster can 
affect this economy. The complexity of the issue forces us to focus on particular mechanisms that 
we consider important to highlight or that are especially useful to shed lights on certain important 
issues that concern the literature on disasters.  
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A rural disaster concentrated in one region: The case of a poor economy 
 
As shown in Section 1 the available empirical evidence suggests that most disasters tend to be 
concentrated in particular geographic areas of the countries, they rarely affect whole countries. We 
consider here a disaster that is geographically concentrated (say a mayor drought or storm) affecting 
part of the rural area of a country but not directly the rest of the country
20. The disaster reduces 
both the capital assets owned by the household-producers (say, it wipes out part of the livestock 
herd) as well as the natural capital (i.e., affect the stock of underground water or the stock of 
biomass used as a source of natural fertility of soils in the context of slash-and-burn agriculture) of 
the area affected. In the context of the model the disaster affects one of the regions where the 
household-producer sector is established, say Region 1, where 
1
A k  and 
1 n  are drastically reduced. In 
addition, depending on the type of disaster it is possible that the total factor productivity in Region 2 
also falls as a consequence of damage affecting local infrastructure and access to markets.   
 
Direct effects.   The direct effects are those affecting directly the household-producer sector of Region 
1. Depending on the intensity of the disaster and on how far are initially the households from the 
subsistence boundary (SS in Figure 1) the fall of 
1
A k  may or may not be reversible.  It may also leave 
the natural capital below the extinction threshold (that is, the level of n after the disaster may end 
up below n).   If the disaster is not large enough, the asset destruction may leave the households still 
above the SS boundary and to the right of the n vertical line such as point  1 d  in Figure 2 and thus 
the process of asset reconstruction is feasible; the system is economically and ecologically reversible 
and the same initial long run asset equilibrium (point 0 in Figure 2) is eventually reestablished. That 
is, the fall in household incomes is merely temporary and the rebuilding of assets will require them 
to temporarily reduce consumption to invest in 
1
A k . 
 
By contrast, if the asset destruction is greater the households’ asset endowment may fall to a point 
below the SS curve and/or to the left of the nline such as points  2 d or  3 d  in Figure 3.  At any of 
                                                            
20 In Honduras the hurricane Mitch caused elevated damages and losses to the “primary” sector (resource dependant); in 
Aceh the relative damage to the primary sector are also higher than to the enterprise sector. Table 4 provides evidence 
about the distribution of damages for other countries as well.        
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these points the dynamics of the system, as shown by the arrows, is towards continuous 
consumption of the capital left and continuous loss of natural capital; that is, the household falls into 
spiraling reduction of income and of 
1
A k . In Figure 3 the point  4 d reflects a reduction of factor 
endowments to a point that is still above the economic and ecological thresholds but at a level of n 
below 
1/2
02 (/)  . In this case, it is possible that the subsequent dynamic of the system may push the 
sector first into the ecological trap (belown) and subsequently below the SS curve as well. This is a 
case where irreversible ecological loss, not directly the disaster, leads to the poverty trap.     
Eventually, the households cease to be viable as a production entity and must emigrate either to the 
other rural region not affected by the disaster (Region 2) and/or to the enterprise sector (in this case 
the second equality is valid in Equation (15’.i)).  The subsistence trap is the most interesting case 
because it has important secondary effects which over the long run may affect the growth patterns 
of the entire economy.  
 
Short-run secondary effects. The secondary effects are in part linked to the labor market. The wiping out 
of 
1
A k  and the consequent elimination of Region 1 as a source of jobs cause downward pressures on 
wages and eliminates a source of tax revenues. From Equation (34) it is clear that if 
1
A k  is eliminated 
the demand for labor falls, which in turn causes w to decrease. The fall of w has implications for 
capital accumulation in both the Region 2 and the enterprise sector. The lower w will increase the 
rate of return to capital in both Region 2 and the enterprise sector.  
 
In Region 2 the wage reduction may have two very different effects. The fall in wages will move the 
subsistence curve (SS) upwards and if such a movement is large enough it may lend the old 
equilibrium asset endowment in Region 2 below subsistence as illustrated in Figure 4.  In this case 
the collapse of Region 1 could spill over into the permanent collapse of at least some of the 
households in Region 2 as well.   Alternatively, if households in region 2 were initially wealthier the 
upward shift of the SS curve would still leave the households above subsistence. The Region 2 in 
this case would accumulate more physical capital in the short run as the returns to capital increase. 
This would reduce natural capital, if such reduction is not large enough to put the household below 
the ecological threshold, Region 2 would be able to achieve a new long-run equilibrium with more       
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physical capital and less natural capital. The net effect of the disaster is thus to reduce the long-run 
levels of natural capital. 
 
The enterprise sector also increases its rate of investment as   rises and consequently the 
() h     gap increases (see Equation 26). Thus, the economy as a whole will experience a faster 
rate of capital accumulation at least over a period of time. Output (GDP) will also grow faster than 
prior to the disaster. This is consistent with some empirical studies that have documented an 
acceleration of growth after disasters (Albala-Bertrand 1993).  Moreover, this higher rate of 
investment and faster growth are not merely a catching up process. In fact, the accelerated 
investment takes place in sectors that are not directly affected by the disaster and it is possible that 
even accounting for the reduction of capital in the Region 1, the net effect on investment be still 
positive.  
 
Long-run secondary effects. The fall in wages and the disappearance of Region 1 as a productive sector, 
however, erodes the tax base for the government which, in turn, barring a reallocation of 
government expenditures is likely to cause a deceleration of the rate of investment in human capital. 
As seen in Equation (33) a fall in w reduces  ˆ h.  So  ˆ
M k  increases and  ˆ h falls.  From (37) it is clear 
that this may upset the balanced growth process as  ˆ h falls below its required rate of growth 
necessary to support the new rate of physical capital investment. Thus, over the long run, once the 
effects of a lower level of h start to be felt in the economy w will start increasing and the rate of 
growth of the enterprise sector decelerates. Moreover, the household-producers in Region 2 start 
disinvesting.  The economy’s rate of growth over the long run is reduced. But as wages recover, tax 
revenues and, consequently, the human capital sector growth rate also recover until  ˆ h reaches the 
new required rate that sustain the capital growth in the enterprise sector.   
 
A rural disaster concentrated in one region: The case of a middle-income economy 
 
As in the previous case we assume that prior to the disaster the economy is in steady state, which 
means that the households sector has reached asset levels 
*
A k  and 
* n  which implies that 
(,) rn pw = (,, ) qzw  .  We consider here two alternative initial steady state scenarios: (i) one that       
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entails positive long run growth prior to the disaster. That is, where the capital market is in full 
equilibrium (all rates of return to capital are equalized) and 
c hh  (see Equation (40)) with the 
enterprise sector, therefore, able to grow permanently. (ii) The economy is stagnated where 
investments in human capital are insufficient to permit continuous growth of the enterprise sector 
(i.e., 
c hh  ). In this case  ˆ 0 M k  . 
 
(i) The case of a growing economy            
 
Direct and short-run effects. A key difference with the poor economy is that now the wage rate of the 
economy may not be affected. The direct effect which causes a discrete fall on 
2
A k  leads to a 
temporary reduction on the demand for labor. However, any slack in labor demand is picked up by 
the human capital sector (see (34’)). That is,  H hl  increases, which means that the rate of growth of 
human capital will rise
21.  This may in turn prevent a fall in the wage rate even in the short run.
22   
 
The negative short run effects of a geographically concentrated disaster mainly stay within the region 
where the disaster happens. Moreover, in an economy with integrated capital markets the 
household-producer sector is less likely to fall into the poverty trap than in a poor economy. The 
main reason is that the wage rate does not fall and therefore the income of household-producers 
falls less than in the poor economy. At least the wage component of their income does not decrease. 
Moreover, even if Region 1 falls into the extreme poverty trap this will not have negative spillover 
effects into Region 2 because the main mechanism by which these spillovers take place is via the fall 
in the wage rate. Thus, a localized disaster tend to remain much more contained within the locality 
when capital markets work and the private sector is allowed to invest in human capital production 
than when the capital markets are not developed.       
 
                                                            
21 Note that condition (40) is now weaker as 
c h falls and therefore if the economy was before the disaster increasing its 
level of human capital will continue to do so after the disaster. 
22 Empirical evidence for Brazil is consistent with the positive effect of a weakening labor market on human capital 
investment; a study by Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003 ), shows that falling wages and employment conditions cause 
an increased enrollment in education and a fall in high school dropouts which, in turn, ameliorate the fall in wages.        
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The fall of n in the Region 1 will reduce the rate of return to capital in the region creating a gap 
between 
* (,, ) qzw   and 
* (,) rn pw  thus upsetting the long run equilibrium condition that calls for 
equalization in the rates of return to physical capital.  This would induce pressures to mobilize part 
of the household-producer sector capital towards the enterprise sector. However, the capital stock 
may not be easily converted from  A k into  M k in the short run. The transfer of capital must occur 
gradually over time by allowing  A k to depreciate for a while and by the household-sector investing all 
their savings in bonds issued by the enterprise sector instead.   This allows for a faster recovery of 
the natural resource stock than in the poor economy where the household can only invest its savings 
in its own productive capital.  Eventually n returns to the same steady state level 
* n  at which point 
the rate of return to capital in the household sector becomes again equal to that of the rest of the 
economy again. An important implication of this is that when capital markets are well developed the 
economy will be able to recover the natural capital destroyed by a disaster more rapidly than an 
economy where capital markets do not exist.     
 
Medium-term effects.  The expansion of  H hl  that takes place in the short run causes a faster human 
capital accumulation.  But as h now grows faster the effective supply of labor increases more rapidly 
which in turn causes incipient reductions of w. Any small decrease in w improves the rate of return 
to  M k  which in turn induces an increase of the demand for labor in the enterprise sector thus 
allowing to cancel any such wage decrease.  The fall of wage rate below 
* w  is thus only ephemeral.  
 
In the meantime the Region 2 recovers its stock of natural resources to the level 
* n . At that point it 
starts rebuilding its stock of physical capital until the old steady state is reestablished with 
*
A A kk  .  
The long run rate of growth of this economy will not be affected. This follows from the fact that 
ˆ
M k  remains unchanged over the long run. In fact, given that w remains constant at 
* w  it follows 
from (26) that  ˆ
M k  returns to its pre-disaster level.  
 
Summary:  Disaster shocks in a growing middle-income economy cause a temporary acceleration of economic growth 
but over the long run the economy grows at the pre-disaster rate. The household-producer sector is less likely to fall into       
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a poverty trap and thus over the long run is more likely to fully recover than in the case of the economy with 
undeveloped capital markets. 
   
(ii) The case of a stagnated economy 
 
The economy is initially stagnated because the labor demand from the household and enterprise 
sectors do not leave enough space to the human capital sector to produce new human capital to 
allow positive growth. That is, prior to the disaster the stocks  ,, MA kk n  are too high vis-à-vis h, 
making the combined demand for efficiency labor from the household and enterprise sectors too 
large to allow human capital to experience net growth. This implies that initially the wage rate per 
unit of efficiency labor has become too high to support net growth of both  M k  and h. As shown 
earlier, this equilibrium wage rate is 
0 w , defined by the wage rate that makes 
0 (,, ) k qzw     . 
Moreover, this equilibrium wage rate is higher than the wage rate that would prevail if the economy 
were able to accumulate human capital (i.e, 
0* ww  ). At the stagnating equilibrium the economy 
does not invest in human capital not because its rate of return is low (in fact, it is easy to see that at 
0 w  we have that
0 (,, )
H
hk rB L q z w     ) but because the composition of the asset 
endowments do not allow for any residual labor to be invested in the human capital sector. 
Importantly, the fact that the wage per efficiency time, 
0 w , is greater in a stagnated economy than 
the wage rate that would prevail in a growing economy, 
* w , does not mean that the wage per unit of 
actual time worked is lower. In fact, the actual wage of a growing economy, 
* () wht  eventually would 
overcome the actual wage of a stagnating economy at some point in time, t . 
 
A disaster causes a temporary reduction of  A k  and n. This lowers the demand for efficiency labor 
leaving space for the human capital sector to use some of the labor left available to produce human 
capital. The human capital sector will increase its use of the surplus labor partly off-setting the labor 
demand reduction. The wage rate nonetheless needs to fall in the short run towards 
* w before the 
human capital becomes competitive and employ the surplus labor being generated. At that point 
short run equilibrium is reached where now human capital starts growing and the economy expands. 
If the household-producer sector does not fall into the subsistence trap, the levels of  A k  and n       
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eventually recover to the same pre-disaster levels. Once this happens the asset composition of the 
economy is likely to be more favorable than prior to the disaster in the sense that it may then be 
more amenable to allow the human capital sector to grow while keeping the wage rate pegged at 
* w . 
Over the intermediate run both h and  A k  have been increasing. If h has grown at a sufficiently 
faster pace than  A k  it is possible that the condition 
c hh   be maintained (see (40)). In this case 
what was a stagnant economy prior to the disaster becomes a growing one after the disaster
23.  
 
Summary:  A disaster that affects more intensively the stock of physical capital than human capital may propel a 
middle-income economy from chronic economic stagnation to permanent economic growth.   
 
This result is consistent with empirical studies that have shown that some countries tend to grow 
faster over the long run after disasters than before them (Albala-Bertrand 1993). Moreover, certain 
empirical studies have also shown that growth expansion after disasters tends to happen more often 
in middle-income countries than in poor countries (Cuaresma et al. 2008). The previous analysis 
predicts precisely this; we showed that this phenomenon may occur in countries where the private 
sector plays an important role in providing human capital and where capital markets are well 
developed which are often middle-income countries. 
 
Some authors including Popp (2006) and Skoufias (2003) have recognized that the destruction of 
physical assets may promote greater investment in human capital and Duryea et.al. (2003) has even 
provided rigorous empirical documentation of it for Brazil.  What has not been recognized in the 
literature is that this effect could cause permanent growth effects and can make the difference between 
stagnation and continuous economic growth over the long run. Under certain conditions facilitated 
by the existence of well developed capital markets and full participation of the private sector in the 
                                                            
23 This phenomenon is consistent with and illustrated by the following observation: Anyone familiar with academics 
knows that the number of applications for entering universities both to undergraduate and graduate programs shoot up 
during recessions. Most of the increased university applicants come from the labor force or would have entered the 
labor force instead of pursuing further studies if the labor market were in better shape.  Also, in times of recession it is 
much easier to retain faculty members and to attract new ones which otherwise would be employed in the private 
commercial sector. Effectively, the “real” sector of the economy competes with the human capital sector for both 
potential students and teachers which otherwise could be employed by the commercial sector of the economy.  This 
competition becomes much less intense in times of recession, which may have the effect of promoting a more rapid 
expansion of the human capital of the economy.           
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production of new human capital there this a potential for a qualitative shift of the economic regime 
from stagnation to growth.    
 
Migration.  If the disaster triggers significant migration it may have an opposite effect: increasing 
migration could upset the economy’s asset composition against growth. If a significant part of the 
labor force emigrates, the critical level of human capital that makes possible the growth process to 
continue, 
c h  in (40), could increase. As can be seen in (40) a reduction in L increases 
c h ; this 
leaves open the possibility that an economy where h was prior to the disaster above the critical 
threshold might end up below it and, hence, unable to continue expanding its human capital and 
possibly stagnate.  
 
Thus, disasters prompt two opposing forces: on the one hand they reduce the demand for labor 
from the productive sector which is a force that promotes greater investment in human capital and 
hence is pro-growth. On the other hand, it may induce migration which reduces the supply of 
human capital and thus reduces the human capital available for human capital accumulation and 
hence is growth depressing.    
 
A prediction from the analysis is that countries where the migration response elasticity is large (say 
Honduras or El Salvador which by been close to the US magnet and by having a large portion of its 
population abroad may facilitate further migration in difficult times) are more likely to fall into 
stagnation after a disaster than countries where the migration elasticity is smaller due to geographic 
isolation and low historical rates of migration (say Chile or Argentina).  The diverse migration 
responsiveness between Chile and Honduras may contribute to explain the big contrast between the 
experiences of Honduras after the massive disaster brought by hurricane Mitch and Chile after the 
1960 equally massive earthquake. Chile post 1960 suffered relatively modest losses of lives and 
experienced negligible emigration as a consequence of its isolation and lack of migration experience 
at the time. The dramatic disaster in Chile caused no perceptible deceleration of economic growth 
over the next ten years. By contrast, there is hard evidence that emigration from Honduras 
dramatically increased after Mitch and there is also evidence showing that the rate of growth in       
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Summary: A disaster that directly or indirectly reduces human capital more than physical capital may cause an 
initially growing economy to fall into a stagnation trap or may not help an initially stagnant economy to become a 
growing one.  
  
As shown in section I the empirical evidence suggests that most disasters tend to affect more the 
physical capital basis than the human capital level.  Loayza et.al. (2009) are able to find certain 
empirical regularity concerning the effects of disasters on growth that is consistent with our findings: 
Disasters that reduce the capital labor ratio of the economy tend to cause faster growth while 
disasters that increase such ratio cause the opposite effect.           
 
V. PRONENESS TO DISASTERS 
 
So far we have considered mainly how an economy evolves in response to one (possibly 
unexpected) major disaster. Another issue is how an economy evolves when people know ex-ante 
that smaller but recurrent disasters periodically occur.  The literature that considers this issue has 
concluded that a possible response to expected recurrent disasters is to cut back investments on 
physical assets which are usually more vulnerable to disasters and to expand investments on assets 
such as human capital that are less vulnerable  (Skidmore and Toya 2002).  Empirical corroboration 
of this hypothesis, however, is extremely difficult to satisfactorily implement mainly because of 
inadequate data on assets, particularly human capital (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1997, 2000).  So the 
existing empirical evidence is rather weak. Below we provide some further conceptual probing of 
this story in the context of an economy that has well developed capital markets. 
 
The simplest way of capturing the ex-ante disaster expectation effect is to assume that such 
expectation increases the expected asset depreciation rate of the vulnerable assets ( k  in the context 
                                                            
24 In addition, Benson and Clay (2004), discuss the cases of Dominica and Montserrat, where migration has meant a 
significant loss of human capital and has contributed to the impoverishment of poor households and communities.       
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of the model).  At the beginning of each period investors consider the expected return for the period 
that one extra dollar invested in the asset yields. Assume that the asset flow yield is accrued at the 
beginning of the period but you need to keep your money tied until the end of such period during 
which there is a risk of losing part of the principal (you milk your cow early in the morning but there 
is a small probability of losing the cow at the end of day, say as a consequence of a lightening).  This 
means that the expected net rate of return to one dollar of physical capital is  () k    , where 
k     is the effective rate of depreciation (  is of course the probability of losing the capital stock 
which in turn depends on the probability of disaster)
 25.  
 
Assume that unlike physical capital, human capital is not exposed to disaster risk. Then, assuming 
that the economy is diversified (i.e., it produces new human capital), equations (14’), (15) and (39) 
imply,  
 
(39’)                                      (,, )
d
k qzw     h BL    
 
Clearly, the equilibrium wage 
d w <
* w ; that is, the expectation of disasters has the effect of reducing 
the wage rate that allows for the rates of return to investment in human capital production and 
elsewhere in the economy to equalize. It follows that the rate of growth of physical capital 
accumulation, 
 
(26’)                         
1 ˆ (,, ) ( )
d
Mk kq z w
a
        , 
 
                                                            
25 A more elaborated example: You invest in a bond January 1 and receive on that day a coupon for the interests, equal 
to r  for each dollar invested which you may redeem on that day but you need to leave your principal invested until the 
end of the year. There is a certain probability,  , of default within that year.  The level of   used in ex-ante evaluating 
the net rate of return, in turn, may depend on the probability of a disaster. The more prone to disaster a country is the 
higher is  .This is your effective expected depreciation rate. Thus the ex-ante expected rate of return is r    .               
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is affected by two effects: a direct one which reduces it and an indirect one via the fall in the wage 
rate that acts in the opposite direction. It can be shown, however, that the net effect is negative, that 
is, the direct effect dominates the indirect one
26.  
  
Thus, the first part of the hypothesis in the literature, that a higher probability of disaster reduces the 
rate of accumulation of physical assets is corroborated. What about the literature’s second 
hypothesis: does the rate of human capital accumulation increase in more disaster prone countries?  
Consider the labor market equilibrium again now evaluated at 
d w instead of 
* w , 
 
(34’’)                 
**
32 (,, ) ( , ) ( 1 )
dd d
MA H qzw k r npw k h l h L         
 
For given levels of  M k ,  A k , and h, it is clear that the fact that 
* d ww   implies that 
* d
H H ll  ; that is, 
the rate of human capital accumulation as shown in (28’) is also reduced by the expectation of 
disasters.  This contradicts the second hypothesis in the literature. But of course the fact that 
M k grows at a lower rate could imply that, given enough time,  
d
H l   could become larger than 
*
H l and 
thus, eventually the rate of human capital accumulation could become faster than in the case where 
there is less probability of disaster. Could this effect allow human capital to grow faster? 
 
A way of probing this is to perform the following experiment: Suppose a country that is 
experiencing positive growth is affected by an increased probability of disaster.  Scientists in a 
particular country credibly conclude that climate change is likely to cause a greater frequency of 
periodic disasters in the future.  How would the economy with initial levels of assets 
(0), (0), (0) MA kkn and  (0) h  respond to such a prediction? The level of  increases and thus the 
impact effect is to decrease w which, in turn, causes an increase in the demand for labor from the 
enterprise and household-producer sectors. The increased demand for labor from the productive 
sectors will crowd-out the human capital sector causing the rate of human capital accumulation to 
fall. In addition, the rate of accumulation of physical capital would be decreased because as before 
the direct negative impact of a higher   on the returns to capital dominates the indirect wage effect.  
                                                            
26 A formal proof available from the author.       
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Thus, the impact effect is to reduce both the rate of investment in physical capital as well as the rate 
of investment in human capital. Unlike the popular hypothesis in the literature, physical capital and 
human capital are dynamic complements not substitutes over the long run
27.   
 
An implication of this is that the hypothesis that proneness to disasters causes faster human capital 
accumulation is at least questionable. Further empirical probing of this assumption is needed using 
better data on human capital that is beginning to emerge. Students from many countries are now 
participating in standardized cognitive tests in various subjects. In fact, for some of these subjects 
(especially mathematics) there is by now a large number of score measures over the last decade and a 
half for many countries. As is recognized in the literature the test scores are a much better indicator 
of human capital than simply enrollment rates or numbers of schooling years.  If the hypothesis that 
more frequent disasters are associated with increasing human capital is corroborated with these 
more elaborated estimates it would mean that the conceptual analysis above should be reconsidered.  
If the new estimates show that this is not the case it would mean that both empirical and conceptual 
analyses point in the some direction, enough cause to reconsider our premises.        
                     
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has developed a dynamic general equilibrium model that allows us to consider the long-
run implications of disasters focusing on the interactive dynamics of intangible vis-à-vis physical 
assets. This paper brings a large number of important insights in the literature into a coherent 
general development theoretic framework.  This allowed us to develop new hypotheses explaining 
seemingly contradictory findings in the empirical literature regarding the growth consequences of 
disasters.  Below we summarize the two most vital specific contributions of this paper.  
 
The first contribution of this paper is to show conditions under which disasters may trigger faster 
economic growth and alternative scenarios where disasters can lead to stagnation.  More 
                                                            
27 In more standard balanced two assets growth models this dynamic complementary characteristic is even more evident. 
For example the Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995 (chapter 4) provides an analysis of one sector growth with human and 
physical capital where over the long run the capital/human capital ratio is constant. This obviously means that any 
reduction in the rate of growth of one of the assets must cause the other asset to also decrease its growth rate.         
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importantly, we have shown that under certain initial conditions a disaster may propel an economy 
from chronic stagnation into a consistent growth path over the long run.  Economies that are too 
rich in physical capital relative to human capital tend to crowd out investments in human capital 
which, in turn, means that the accumulation of physical assets becomes unsustainable in the long 
run.  This brings what we call the paradox of human capital where the scarcity of human capital 
causes a high rate of return to human capital investment yet the market allocation does not allow for 
greater investments in human capital. Thus long run stagnation is the natural outcome.  Disasters 
commonly devastate physical assets but cause much less damage to human capital causing a change 
in the asset endowment of the economy in favor of human capital. This, in turn, may solve the 
stagnation problem allowing the economy to start greater investment in human capital prompting a 
virtuous cycle of economic growth. Disasters may solve the human capital scarcity trap by causing a 
somehow lower rate of return to human capital but also causing market conditions that prevent the 
crowding out of human capital investments.      
 
The second specific contribution of this paper is showing the crucial role of the degree of 
development of capital markets in affecting the disaster consequences.   We have shown that 
disasters concentrated in one region are less likely to cause significant real wage reductions in the 
economy when capital markets are well-developed than when they are not.  This means that the 
existence of capital markets tends to prevent redistribution of income against workers as a 
consequence of disasters.  
 
Moreover, the fact that wages are not affected also implies that the likelihood of disasters causing 
the households to fall below economic irreversible asset thresholds which lead to spiraling 
impoverishment is lower when capital markets are efficient than when they are not. Capital markets 
in general tend to also reduce the likelihood that the ecological thresholds be violated after a disaster. 
The main reason for this is that capital markets relieve pressures on natural resources allowing the 
economy to operate with higher levels of natural capital in normal times. Thus a disaster is likely to 
catch the economy in a better (less vulnerable) natural resource position when capital markets exist 
than when they do not. A similar disaster, therefore, is less likely to induce ecological threshold 
violation and, hence, subsistence traps when capital markets are efficient than when they are not.   
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In addition, capital markets also tend to prevent negative spillovers of disasters affecting one 
particular region into other regions not directly affected. This means that households not directly 
affected by disasters have no risk of falling into poverty traps.  By contrast, when capital markets do 
not exist wage spillovers may easily lead to households in unaffected regions to fall into economic 
and subsequently ecological traps.  An implication of the analysis is that perhaps one of the most 
effective means to reduce the negative impacts of disasters is the development of the institutions 
that allow the capital markets to work.  
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10 years or 
until 2007) 
Honduras (Huracan 
Mitch 1998)  73% 1,151   1.99 -0.12 0.45 0.55 0.89 2.42 
El Salvador 
(Earthquakes in 2001)  10% 2,122   0.97  0.82  1.47 0.94 2.19 1.55 
Nicaragua (Huracan 
Mitch 1998)  28% 715   3.07 3.85 2.65 2.13 -1.71 2.44 
Dominican Republic 
(Huracan Georges 1998)  17% 2,000   5.75  6.32  4.17 4.33 1.80 4.21 
Belize (Huracan Keith 
2000)  34% 3,330   3.20  1.92  1.40 2.78 2.90 2.08 
Maldives (Tsunami 
2004)  78% 3,116   6.02  7.44  4.07 6.21  * 5.63  6.21 
Indonesia (Tsunami 
2004)  2%  904   3.25 4.30 3.08 4.57  * 1.97  4.57 
Chile (Earthquake 1960)  13%  1,875  -2.47  2.11  0.43 1.94 1.26 1.97 
 
Province  Total Damage (% 
GDP) 
Real GDP per capita in 
disaster year (constant 2000 
US$) 
Growth GDP per capita % 
(average 2 previous years) 
Growth GDP per capita % 
(average 2 following years) 
Growth GDP per capita % 
(average 4 previous years) 
Growth GDP per capita % 
(average 4 following years) 
Aceh, Indonesia (Tsunami 2004)*  97%  1,108  4.88  4.31  2.55*  4.18* 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from WDI and from BPS (Provincial Statistic Bureau of Aceh) 
*Three year average (GDP per capita for 2008 hasn’t been published yet) 









Impact of Droughts and Earthquakes on long run Sector growth 
(Based on Loayza et al., 2009) 
 
Dependent variable  Droughts  Earthquakes 
Growth Rate of GDP per capita       (-)***  (+) 
Growth Rate of Agricultural Value-added per 
capita  
     (-)***  (-) 
Growth Rate of Industrial Value-added per 
capita 
(-)       (+)*** 
(-) negative impact on growth 
+  positive impact on growth 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
Source: own elaboration based on the results of the regressions of Loayza et. al. (2009) 
 














 TABLE 3 
CAPITAL STOCK AND HUMAN LIVES LOST DUE TO A DISASTER IN JAPAN AND HONDURAS 
 
     
 Japan (Kobe 
Earthquake, 1995) 
Honduras (Mitch 
Hurricane,  1998) 
Damage in Stock of Capital  % of Country GDP  2.30%  12% 
Number of persons  106,500   65,745  
Lost Population (Deaths + migration)  % of Total 
Population  0.08% 1.12% 
Source: Horwich (2000), for Japan and Meza (2006) for Honduras. 




DAMAGES IN PRODUCTIVE SECTORS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 
Agriculture, Livestock, 
Fisheries, Forestry (% of 
Sectorial GDP) 




















86.6% 72.9% 99.9%  65.6% 7.4% 40.4% 
El Salvador 
(Earthquakes in 2001) 
18.3% 9.6% 3.7%  5.5% 5.2% 0.6% 
Nicaragua (Huracan 
Mitch 1998) 
9.7% 27.6%  18.3%  8.1% 2.0%  19.5% 
Rep. Dom (Huracan 
Georges 1998) 
19.0% 17.1% 46.8%  39.1% 9.5%  6.5% 
Belize (Huracan Keith 
2000) 
24%  33.7%  31.7% 19.2% 37.8% 12.6% 
Maldives (Tsunami 
2004) 
4.8% 77.7%  35.3%  9.9% 26.6%  37.0% 
Aceh, Indonesia 
(Tsunami 2004) 
24.0% 97.0% 20.3%  59.9% 7.5% 12.5% 
*Damage represents the total or partial destruction of physical assets, such as infrastructure, buildings, furniture and 
equipment. Damage occurs at the time of the disaster, and is measured at replacement value. 
**Losses are changes in economic flows that arise as a result of damage. They include decline in production and sales or 
increased production costs; lower revenues and higher production costs in the provision of services; and increased 
expenditures arising from the disaster. They occur after the disaster and over a relatively long period of time until full 
reconstruction and recovery has been attained 
Source: Own elaboration based of assessment reports from ECLAC and ADPC, for macroeconomic values WDI and Central 




COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE BEFORE AND AFTER DISASTERS IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 
 (% of total government expenditure) 
 
SOCIAL  ECONOMIC SERVICES  OTHER SERVICES 
























Honduras (Huracan Mitch 
1998)  28.2 29.6 33.4 22.4 23.2 19.2 49.4 47.2 47.6 
Aceh (Tsunami 2004)  46.3  34.6  38.3 10.7  9.9  8.0 43.2  55.6  53.7 
El Salvador (Earthquakes 
in 2001)  36.2 41.5 37.6 12.1 12.3 10.2 51.8 46.2 52.3 
Nicaragua (Huracan Mitch 
1998)  37.0 33.7 40.6 22.0 26.7 28.9 41.1 39.6 30.5 
Rep. Dom (Huracan 
Georges 1998)  38.3 35.5 39.1 34.5 31.8 26.2 27.2 32.8 34.6 
Maldives (Tsunami 2004)  47.9  46.5 51.6 14.6 14.9 11.9 37.5 38.5 36.5 
 
Social public expenditure: Housing  and community ammenities, Health, Education and Social Protection Economic Services: General economic, commercial, and labor affairs; 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; fuel and energy; mining, manufacturing and construction; transport; communication; other industries, R&D Economic affairs 
Other Services: General Public Services, Defense, Public Order and Safety, Recreation, culture and religion 




SPENDING ON PUBLIC VS PRIVATE GOODS: TRENDS IN FOUR COUNTRIES, 1985-2005 
Brazil- Federal and state government expenditure  1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 Average
Share of public goods expenditures in total gov't  42% 30%  47% 35% 37% 38% 41%
Share of private goods and subsidy in total gov't  24% 47%  36% 27% 32% 32% 34%
Ratio of type A over type B 1.80 0.64 1.31 1.30 1.16 1.18 1.27
    
Chile - Central government expenditure 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 Average
Share of public goods expenditures in total gov't  n.a. 70%  78% 80% 82% 83% 77%
Share of private goods expenditures in total gov't  n.a. 30%  22% 20% 18% 17% 23%
Ratio of type A over type B n.a. 2.32 3.55 4.03 4.70 4.83 3.58
    
China- General government expenditure 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 Average
Share of public goods expenditures in total gov't  64% 60%  45% 50% 48% 48% 51%
Share of private goods and subsidies in total gov't  34% 26%  17% 15% 14% 14% 21%
Ratio of type A over type B 1.88 2.30 2.68 3.29 3.37 3.45 2.53
    
India- Consolidated general government 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2005 Average
Share of Public goods expenditures/Total exp & Net  32% 31%  29% 29% 29% 32% 30%
Share of Private goods expenditures/Total exp & Net  18% 18%  18% 18% 19% 18% 18%
Ratio of type A/ type B 1.77 1.71 1.63 1.62 1.49 1.82 1.63
Souurce: Lopez et al. 2008. The Quality of Growth: Fiscal Policies for Better Results. IEG-World Bank 
Public goods are defined as:  Public order and safety, Environment protection, Housing and community amenities, Health, Recreation, culture and Religion, Education, and Social 
protection. Type A interventions emphasize using the government expenditures to reduce the impact of market failure on the accumulation of assets, particularly human capital, 
knowledge and the environment. Type B intervention focuses on (non-social) subsidies to private goods which are often captured by the elites. Subsidies to private goods, including 
commodity subsidies, credit subsidies, grants to corporations, loan guarantees, marketing subsidies and others are much more easily appropriated by the most powerful interests that are 










% of Public 
Expenditure 
% of GDP 
Bolivia 3.0%  0.8% 
Congo, Republic of  5.0%  1.0% 
Dominican Republic  3.2%  0.5% 
Ghana 2.0%  0.4% 
Honduras 2.4%  0.4% 
India 1/  4.6%  0.7% 
Indonesia 20.2%  3.4% 
Jordan 17.4%  5.6% 
Lebanon 0.3%  0.1% 
    
Implicit subsidies 
  
% of Public 
Expenditure 
% of GDP 
Bangladesh 10.3%  0.9% 
Egypt 19.9%  4.1% 
Peru 0.4%  0.1% 
Souurce: Own ellaboration based on  Lopez et al. 2008. The Quality of Growth: Fiscal  







PER CAPITA ANNUAL ASSET GROWTH RATES FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES (1990-2001) 
 
Country  Growth of Physical 
Capital per capita 
Growth of Human 
and Environmental 
Assets per Capita 
Growth of Net 
Total Wealth 
per Capital 
Mexico 2.0%  -0.6%  -0.1% 
Paraguay 1.6%  -1.8%  -1.0% 
Chile 3.0% -0.6%  0.2% 
Ecuador 3.5%  -2.6%  -1.3% 
Costa Rica  1.4%  1.0%  1.1% 
Peru 1.8% -0.8%  -0.2% 
Uruguay 0.0%  0.2% 0.1% 
Argentina 0.0%  -0.5% -0.4% 
Bolivia 1.0%  -2.0%  -1.6% 
Brazil 2.0% -0.6%  -0.1% 
Venezuela 1.5%  -4.0% -1.5% 
Comparators          
Korea 3.5%  1.2%  1.8% 
Ireland 2.7%  1.7%  2.0% 




Physical Capital and Human Capital Stocks for High and Middle Income Countries  
(2005 USD per capita) 

























income  3,373 4,406 5,885 6.42% 6,885 7,433 9,444 3.50% 
Upper middle 
income  13,644 15,376 15,802 1.55% 49,649 40,671 54,097 1.49% 
High  income 84,510  90,937  97,043  1.43%  371,268 412,935 446,637  1.94% 





PERFORMANCE ON COGNITIVE TEST (PISA TEST)  
FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES IN THE YEARS 2000 AND 2006 
 
  
Performance on the 
combined literacy scale 
Performance on the 
combined literacy 
scale 
    Year 2000  Year 2005 
Mexico  422   410  
Chile  410   442  
Argentina  418   374  
Brasil  396   393  
Peru 327    * 
Indonesia  371   393  
Comparators 
Greece  474   460  
Ireland  527   517  
Korea  525   556  
Poland  479   508  
Portugal   470   472  
Spain  493   461  
*not available in the publication 
**deflated by US CPI 




Private Education Enrollment in Primary and Secondary School, Private Education Expenditures, and Performance of 
the Private and Public Schools in the PISA test 2000 for selected countries. 
 
Country 
% of students in the 
private sector 
 Private Education 
Expenditures as a 
Percentage of Total 
Education Expenditures 
Performance of the 
Private Schools on 
the combined 
reading literacy scale
Performance of the 
Public  Schools on the 
combined reading 
literacy scale 
Argentina 6.5  12.1  498  381 
Brasil 10.5  *    460  386 
Chile   12.9  30  484  387 
Indonesia 46.6  23.5  357  380 
Korea 33.6  22.6  533  519 
Mexico 14.9  16.9  491 413 
Peru 6.7  40.7  428  314 
Thailand 17.5    *  422  433 
*not available  









Source: Masyrafah, H. and McKeon, J. (2008). “Post-tsunami aid effectiveness in Aceh Proliferation and coordination in reconstruction”  






Souurce: Lopez et al. 2008. The Quality of Growth: Fiscal Policies for Better Results. IEG-World Bank 




























Adjustment towards long-run equilibrium when there are no capital markets 
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Effect of a moderate disaster in Region 1: Reversible Damage 
(when there are no capital markets) 
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Effect of a Major disaster in Region 1: Irreversible Damage 
(when there are no capital markets) 
 
 





































Effects of a Disaster in Region 1 on Region 2 
Fall in wages displaces upwards the subsistence curve and some producers in Region 2 may 
fall into subsistence trap. 
(when there are no capital markets) 
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